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 I.   INTRODUCTION 
 As a ten-year-old boy, Robert Donovan began cross-dressing and, 
as a teenager, felt urges to cut off his penis.1 At age sixty-five, and 
then-named Rhiannon O’Donnabhain, she was forced to describe this 
childhood cross-dressing and adolescent gender anxiety to a federal 
agency.2 Lynnette Harris made derogatory comments about sex with 
her boyfriend who had hand-written love letters to her.3 She had to 
reveal both her comments and his love letters to a federal agency.4 
When Katia Popov’s mother-in-law visited from Bulgaria, she shared 
the bedroom with Katia and her husband.5 Katia, in turn, had to dis-
close this to a federal agency.6 Dairy farmer Melvin Nickerson proba-
bly never imagined that he would need to disclose his farm journal 
reading list to a federal agency.7 But he did.8 Equally unlikely would 
have been Ramsay and Elizabeth Farah ever anticipating their need 
to inform a federal agency about one adult son’s adultery, another 
adult son’s hot tub use, and their adult daughter’s limited  
college choices.9  
 Which agency was entitled to all of this information? The Internal 
Revenue Service (IRS). The IRS is authorized to collect any infor-
mation relevant to the 145,000,000 individual income tax returns 
filed each year.10 It does not need probable cause to suspect a crime. 
It does not need to suspect an understatement of tax. It does not need 
to suspect a misstatement of any type. A taxpayer may find his or her 
medical records, love letters, family dynamics, reading habits, or oth-
er details of private life subject to the IRS’s review.11 This is what 
happened to Rhiannon O’Donnabhain, Lynette Harris, Katia Popov, 
Melvin Nickerson, and Ramsay and Elizabeth Farah. 
 It seems most likely that very few of those who file one of the 
145,000,000 individual income tax returns (reporting information on 
over 289,000,000 individuals) understand how many personal details 
                                                                                                                  
 1. See discussion infra notes 282-89 and accompanying text. 
 2. See discussion infra notes 282-89 and accompanying text. 
 3. See discussion infra notes 332-38 and accompanying text.  
 4. See discussion infra notes 332-38 and accompanying text  
 5. See discussion infra notes 321-22 and accompanying text. 
 6. See discussion infra notes 321-22 and accompanying text. 
 7. See discussion infra notes 325-31 and accompanying text. 
 8. See discussion infra notes 325-31 and accompanying text. 
 9. See discussion infra notes 314-18 and accompanying text. 
 10. See discussion infra note 339 and accompanying text. This Article focuses on the 
individual income tax and the privacy interests especially important to individuals. How-
ever, other types of taxpayers also have interests in privacy. See, e.g., Joshua D. Blank, 
Reconsidering Corporate Tax Privacy, 11 N.Y.U. J.L. & BUS. 31 (2014) (discussing the rela-
tionship between corporate tax privacy and compliance). 
 11. See discussion infra Section IV.C. 
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may come within the IRS’s grasp.12 If taxpayers read the Internal 
Revenue Code, the Treasury Regulations, and the related case law, 
they would be on notice as to the personal details they should be pre-
pared to deliver.13 But, of course, it is not surprising that taxpayers 
do not understand that they may be obligated to turn over such de-
tailed information. Regardless, a miniscule audit rate means that 
over 99% of taxpayers are never required to meet those obligations.14 
The IRS almost never asks, and so almost no taxpayer will ever know 
how much information the agency is entitled to review.  
 There are both practical and principled reasons to be concerned 
about taxpayer privacy. As a practical matter, the IRS is currently un-
able to collect much of the information it needs. The cost of this inabil-
ity to collect needed information is about $450 billion in uncollected 
taxes each year.15 Over the coming decades, the pressure to close this 
‘tax gap’ will press the IRS to increase its use of advanced technology 
to narrow the related ‘information gap.’16 Taxpayers’ love letters, read-
ing lists, medical records, and evidence of family dynamics are increas-
ingly digitized and stored in ways unimaginable even a decade ago. As 
the IRS becomes practically enabled to access digitized information, on 
what terms should it access the information? The practical need for a 
coherent privacy policy in taxation will increase as the technological 
ability of the IRS to gather information increases.  
 Furthermore, among government agencies, the IRS has the broad-
est legal authority to collect information that minimizes privacy, 
which as a matter of principle, should prompt study of the privacy 
implications of its behavior.17 Information is placed within that au-
thority so long as it is relevant for tax purposes.18 And in the contem-
porary income tax system, an extraordinary amount of information is 
relevant for tax purposes. Tax law is not a matter of mere economic 
measurement.19 Almost any aspect of personal life can be tax rele-
vant. The tax system is driven by a mix of policies: health care, pov-
erty relief, housing, economic stimulation, environmental protection, 
and education, for example.20 Labeling a demand for information as a 
matter of ‘tax law’ should not make the demand seem more special, 
                                                                                                                  
 12. See discussion infra note 339 and accompanying text. 
 13. See discussion infra Section III.A.1. 
 14. See discussion infra notes 254-59 and accompanying text. 
 15. See discussion infra notes 260-77 and accompanying text. 
 16. Of course, the IRS would be doing only what every other government agency and 
privacy company is doing: pursuing the ever-growing gush of data from the Internet-of-
Things and other information technology. See discussion infra notes 251-78 and  
accompanying text. 
 17. See discussion infra Sections III.A.1, III.C. 
 18. See infra note 140 and accompanying text.   
 19. See infra notes 290-91 and accompanying text. 
 20. See infra notes 290-95 and accompanying text. 
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simpler, or less controversial than it would be in another context. If 
we would be concerned with the Department of Health and Human 
Services requiring Rhiannon O’Donnabhain to provide the agency 
with the details of her discussions with her therapist, it should be no 
less worrisome that it was only the IRS that demanded that infor-
mation.21 The ‘tax’ label should not obscure the privacy burdens, 
harms, and risks of these demands. 
 But, until this Article, these privacy burdens, harms, and risks 
created by the IRS’s demands have been obscured by the tax label. 
There is more than a century of legal history regulating the use of 
taxpayer information that the IRS has collected.22 And there has 
never been legislative concern with the collection of taxpayer infor-
mation. In 1974, a congressional privacy commission described the 
required “extensive disclosure of personal information by individual 
taxpayers to the IRS” as a “basic violation of privacy.”23 However, 
confined to its congressional mandate, the committee did not investi-
gate the collection of tax information, but focused only on regulating 
the use of the information once collected.24 Tax scholars too have fo-
cused only on the use of information, never its collection.25  
 This disinterest is striking insofar as the American right to priva-
cy predates the Bill of Rights.26 The right to privacy is described in 
dozens of laws: torts, criminal law, contracts, federal and state regu-
latory statutes, and, of course, the Constitution.27 The scholarly in-
terest in privacy first emerged at the end of the nineteenth century. 
As the computer age dawned in the 1970s, privacy scholarship began 
to grow, and as the information technology revolution accelerated in 
the late twentieth century, so too did the growth in privacy scholar-
ship.28 Privacy scholars have argued that in order to be a liberal, 
democratic, and free society, privacy must be protected.29 They have 
argued that privacy promotes expressiveness, innovation, and the 
vitality of both culture and democracy.30 They have articulated ways 
in which to identify and assess privacy harms, including not only the 
unwelcome mental states experienced by individuals whose privacy is 
                                                                                                                  
 21. See discussion infra Sections IV.B, IV.C.2.a. 
 22. See infra Section III.B. 
 23. See infra note 202. 
 24. See infra note 202. 
 25. See infra Section III.C. 
 26. Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 486 (1965). 
 27. See infra Section II.A. 
 28. See infra Section III.A. 
 29. See infra notes 112-24 and accompanying text.  
 30. See infra notes 118-21 and accompanying text. 
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invaded but also societal harms such as the impact on the balance of 
powers between government and individuals.31 
 This Article proposes that tax is a fertile field in which privacy 
scholars should be working. The privacy burdens of taxpayers have 
gone unnoticed by privacy scholars. To the extent that privacy schol-
ars are concerned about the dignity of individuals and ensuring that 
they have “freedom from scrutiny” and “breathing-room” for self-
development,32 the threat to dignity, freedom, and breathing-room 
endured by Rhiannon O’Donnabhain, Lynnette Harris, Katia Popov, 
Melvin Nickerson, Ramsay and Elizabeth Farah, and other taxpayers 
deserves scrutiny. To the extent that privacy scholars worry about 
the peril to a free society, creeping totalitarianism, and undesirable 
shifts of power that collection of information by government agencies 
can bring,33 the IRS’s gathering of information should be no less wor-
risome than that of other agencies, such as the NSA or FBI.  
 This Article also proposes that privacy is a societal value that tax 
scholars should work to incorporate into their research. While unrec-
ognized until now, privacy values are comparable to the values of ef-
ficiency, equity, and administrability that tax scholars have long-
heralded as the markers of a sound tax system. Tax scholars should 
measure the negative impact of specific tax provisions on privacy, 
weigh the impact against any benefits achieved, and propose ways to 
reduce the impact without undermining the benefits. Tax scholars 
should also consider ways in which fundamental reforms could better 
protect privacy without compromising—or perhaps even better, achiev-
ing—the central goals of a sound tax system. For instance, a reform 
increasing the standard deduction and personal exemption amounts 
while decreasing the number of specialized deductions and credits 
might mitigate privacy concerns while also reducing administrative 
costs. Moreover, a more radical change in the tax base itself—perhaps 
a move from an income to a value-added or other consumption tax—
could, as a matter of the base’s own logic, require minimal personal 
information while also enhancing tax enforcement and fairness.  
 This Article is intended to prompt tax and privacy specialists to 
work toward articulating a coherent privacy policy for taxation. 
While any tax system must collect some personal information in or-
der to collect personal tax liabilities, there is always considerable leg-
islative and administrative discretion in deciding what information 
should be relevant and thus collectible. And that discretion should be 
guided by a coherent privacy policy, which can only be devised if tax 
                                                                                                                  
 31. See infra notes 116-17, 122-24 and accompanying text. 
 32. See infra notes 108-11. 
 33. See infra Sections II.B.3, I.B.4. 
584  FLORIDA STATE UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 44:579 
  
specialists recognize the value of privacy and privacy specialists rec-
ognize the breadth and depth of the personal information the IRS is 
entitled to collect.   
 Part II of this Article outlines why privacy matters and how con-
cern for privacy has been expressed by legislators, judges, and schol-
ars. Part III provides the history of laws regulating the dissemination 
of taxpayer information, as well as the related debates among tax 
scholars. Part IV does what none of the privacy scholars’ work de-
scribed in Part II, nor any of the tax scholars’ work described in Part 
III has done, which is to take privacy in taxation seriously. It de-
scribes the tax information collection process, documenting and illus-
trating the breadth and depth of the intimate details subject to col-
lection. This Part closes with recommendations for articulating a 
foundation and context for debating privacy in taxation issues. The 
Article concludes that tax law should be structured so that the collec-
tion and use of private information for tax purposes both protects tax 
revenue and promotes personal privacy. 
 II.   AN OVERVIEW OF PRIVACY 
 To begin recognizing the privacy issues embedded in tax law, an 
overview of both the law and theory of privacy is useful. As outlined 
below, privacy is recognized and protected in tort law, criminal law, 
the law of evidence, contract law, dozens of statutes, and, of course, 
the U.S. Constitution. A legal right to privacy is usually some right to 
control how personal information is collected or used (‘informational 
privacy’). But sometimes the right to privacy is the right to make cer-
tain types of personal decisions (‘decisional privacy’). While the legal 
survey below outlines how privacy is protected, the survey of privacy 
scholars below outlines a sampling of thoughts on why it should be 
protected. The sampled scholars have argued that respect for privacy 
is respect for civility, dignity, and autonomy, and that undermining 
privacy protections undermines creativity, democracy, and the capac-
ity for self-determination.  
A.   Privacy and the Law 
 Although the labeling of certain protections as ‘the right to priva-
cy’ did not happen until the 1890s, the protections existed long be-
fore. These protections are found in various bodies of law—contract, 
criminal, and evidence law, for example. Historically, the common 
law of torts has probably been the most important body of law for de-
fining privacy rights. However, federal statutes enacted since the rise 
of electronic databases in the 1960s have created a regulatory 
framework for the collection and use of private information. These 
federal statutes regulate commercial use of private information, but 
2017]  PRIVACY IN TAXATION 585 
  
more importantly, address government use. Ultimately, the U.S. 
Constitution limits the government’s ability to search for and de-
mand that information be provided, as well as the government’s abil-
ity to restrict the choices individuals can make with respect to inher-
ently private matters.  
1.   Early Developments 
 A legal right to privacy was first articulated in 1890 by Samuel 
Warren and Louis Brandeis in what is among the most influential 
law review articles of all time34: The Right to Privacy.35 Their argu-
ment was not that a variety of policies justified creating a legal right 
to privacy. Rather, it was an argument that a legal right to privacy 
existed in the common law, even though it had yet to be named exact-
ly.36 Warren and Brandeis argued that there was an overarching 
principal of privacy protection in the common law.37 It was “the right 
to be let alone.”38 It was a principle of inviolate personality.39 It was 
not a matter of the law against defamation, as it was not concerned 
only with untruthfulness.40 Nor was it a matter of contract law, as it 
was not limited to negotiated relationships.41 And it was not a mere 
property right, as it was not merely an issue of financial value.42 
Though the right to privacy was reflected in the laws of defamation, 
contract, and property, it transcended these bodies of law. It secured 
to “each individual the right of determining, ordinarily, to what ex-
tent his thoughts, sentiments, and emotions shall be communicated 
to others.”43 Warren and Brandeis argued, at times, that this right 
deserved protection in tort law with injunctions, and, at times, with 
criminal sanctions.44 Respecting this right was part of what it meant 
to live a civilized life, to have civil relations with one another.45 Its 
historical development in the law reflected the historical develop-
ment of civilization.46 The law’s protection of privacy—its protection 
of thoughts, emotions, and feelings—was a protection of an advanced 
                                                                                                                  
 34. More than a century after it was written, the majority, concurrences, and dissent 
in Kyllo v. United States, 533 U.S. 27 (2001), all cited the article. 
 35. Samuel D. Warren & Louis D. Brandeis, The Right to Privacy, 4 HARV. L. REV.  
193 (1890). 
 36. Id. at 193. 
 37. Id. at 197-213. 
 38. Id. at 193. 
 39. Id. at 205. 
 40. Id. at 197. 
 41. Id. at 207-13. 
 42. Id. at 200-04. 
 43. Id. at 198. 
 44. Id. at 219. 
 45. Id. at 195-96. 
 46. Id. at 193-96. 
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civilization.47 And it was most vulnerable to advancements in tech-
nology and the media’s willingness to fulfill the public’s desire for 
knowing the intimate details of others.48 
 Over 125 years later, various laws recognize and reflect numerous 
conceptions of privacy rights. In our contemporary setting, we might 
think first of contract law, given the innumerable ‘terms of service’ 
agreements most of us have clicked through online. But, given that 
privacy harms are not limited to contractual relationships, respect 
for privacy rights pervades many bodies of law. Respecting the right 
of individuals to be free from physical encroachments, criminal law 
protects privacy through laws against trespass, stalking, and bodily 
invasions.49 Criminal law protects private information through laws 
against blackmail, wiretapping, and identity theft.50 Whether in 
criminal or civil courts, the laws of evidence protect some individuals 
from being compelled sources of private information. Even though 
they may be the most efficient sources, under certain circumstances 
spouses, ministers, attorneys, and physicians may not be compelled 
to communicate certain information.51  
 While contract law, criminal law, and the law of evidence are all 
sources of privacy law, perhaps the most important sources are the 
historic common law of torts and the federal statutes regulating in-
stitutional use of private information, which were mostly enacted af-
ter the 1970s. The taxonomy of tort cases was firmly fixed in 1960, 
when Dean William Prosser’s article Privacy was published.52 The 
article presented Dean Prosser’s analysis of the right “to be let alone” 
in over 300 tort cases.53 He described the cases as falling into four 
categories.54 These categories continue to be reflected in the Re-
statement of Torts. There is the tort of intrusion upon seclusion, 
which is an intrusion “upon the solitude or seclusion of another or his 
private affairs or concerns,” if the intrusion would be “highly offen-
sive to a reasonable person.”55 There is the tort of public disclosure of 
private facts, which is a public disclosure of personal information 
that would be “highly offensive to a reasonable person” and “not of 
                                                                                                                  
 47. Id. at 195. 
 48. Id. at 196. 
 49. See, e.g., CAL. PENAL CODE §§ 601, 602 (West 2016) (prohibitions of criminal tres-
pass); § 646.9 (prohibition of stalking); §§ 242, 243, 243.4 (prohibitions of sexual  
battery); §§ 261-264.2 (prohibitions of rape). 
 50. See, e.g., WASH. REV. CODE § 9A.56.130 (2016) (prohibition of extortion); § 
9.73.030 (prohibition of wiretapping); § 9.35.020 (prohibition of identity theft). 
 51. See, e.g., N.J. R. EVID. § 509 (marital privilege); § 511 (priest-penitent privilege); § 504 
(lawyer-client privilege); §§ 505, 506 (psychologist and physician-patient privileges).  
 52. William L. Prosser, Privacy, 48 CALIF. L. REV. 383 (1960). 
 53. Id. at 388-89. 
 54. Id. at 389. 
 55. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 652B (AM. LAW INST. 1977).  
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legitimate concern to the public.”56 There is the false light tort, which 
occurs when a public disclosure of a private matter places someone 
“in a false light” that would be “highly offensive to a reasonable per-
son.”57 And there is the tort of appropriation, which occurs when 
someone “appropriates to his own use or benefit the name or likeness 
of another.”58 To these can be added the torts of libel and slander, 
which Warren and Brandeis considered in their article.59 Further, 
professionals who improperly disclose private information can be sub-
ject to a tort suit for breaching confidentiality.60 And, anyone who  
discloses information in a way that “intentionally or recklessly causes  
severe emotional distress to another” may be sued for infliction of  
emotional distress.61 
2.   Federal Statutes 
 Not long after Dean Prosser’s seminal categorization of privacy 
torts, public concern over privacy in the dawning database age be-
came a political concern. A 1965 proposal for a National Data Center 
galvanized concern and prompted congressional hearings on how pri-
vate information was being collected. In 1966, Congress passed the 
Freedom of Information Act to increase government transparency by 
requiring federal agencies to disclose many types of records to mem-
bers of the public upon request.62 In 1973, the Department of Health, 
Education, and Welfare recommended a set of “Fair Information 
Practices” to govern the collection and use of private information.63 
These practices prohibit secret record-keeping systems, require insti-
tutions keeping records to take steps to prevent misuse, and allow 
individual subjects to inspect and correct information.64 These prac-
tices have “played a significant role in framing privacy laws in the 
United States” and are reflected in multiple statutes.65 The first such 
                                                                                                                  
 56. Id. § 652D.  
 57. Id. § 652E.  
 58. Id. § 652C.  
 59. See Warren & Brandeis, supra note 35, at 197; see also RESTATEMENT (SECOND) 
OF TORTS §§ 558-581 (AM. LAW INST. 1977) (defamatory torts).  
 60. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 874 (AM. LAW INST. 1977) (finding breaches of 
fiduciary duty manifested in breaches of confidentiality); see also McCormick v. England, 
494 S.E.2d 431, 437 (S.C. Ct. App. 1997) (finding a breach of a physician’s duty of confiden-
tiality to be actionable). 
 61. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 46 (AM. LAW INST. 1965) (finding such disclo-
sure would be “extreme and outrageous”). 
 62. Freedom of Information Act, Pub. L. No. 89-487, 80 Stat. 250 (1966). 
 63. U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH, EDUC. & WELFARE, RECORDS, COMPUTERS AND THE RIGHTS 
OF CITIZENS xxii-xxxiii (1973). 
 64. Id. 
 65. Marc Rotenberg, Fair Information Practices and the Architecture of Privacy (What 
Larry Doesn’t Get), 2001 STAN. TECH. L. REV. 1, ¶ 44 (2001) (stating that Fair Information 
Practices frame privacy throughout the world).  
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statute was the 1974 Privacy Act.66 This act also established the U.S. 
Privacy Protection Study Commission to evaluate and make recom-
mendations on improving federal privacy legislation.67 
 Congressional concern for privacy during this time was not limited 
to the government’s collection of private information. For example, 
even before the 1974 Privacy Act, Congress passed the Fair Credit 
Reporting Act to give individuals certain rights regarding the use of 
their information by credit reporting agencies.68 In 1974, information 
in school records became federally protected under the Family Edu-
cational Rights and Privacy Act.69 In 1996, medical information be-
came federally regulated.70 Under current federal law, use of cable 
television71 and videotape rental information72 is regulated, as is the 
online collection of information from children,73 the transmission of 
unsolicited e-mail,74 and the disclosure of private information by  
financial institutions.75 
 Although federal regulation of the commercial use of private in-
formation is significant, the most significant legislation addresses 
government use of private information. With the Privacy Act of 1974, 
Congress gave individuals rights in records of their private infor-
mation held by government agencies, such as the right to inspect and 
correct those records.76 In a number of acts, Congress limited agen-
                                                                                                                  
 66. Privacy Act of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-579, 88 Stat. 1896. Some states have compre-
hensive privacy acts similar to the Federal Privacy Act. See, e.g., California’s Information 
Practices Act of 1977, CAL. CIV. CODE §§ 1798 et seq. (West 2016); Massachusetts’ Fair 
Information Practices Act, MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 66A, §§ 1-3 (2016). 
 67. § 5(a)(1), 88 Stat. at 1905 (establishing the Privacy Protection Study Commission. 
Codified at 5 U.S.C. § 552a (1976)). 
 68. Fair Credit Reporting Act of 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-508, 84 Stat. 1114, 1128 (regu-
lating disclosure of credit report-related information). 
 69. Family Educational Rights and Privacy Act of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-380, 88 Stat. 
571 (1974) (providing educational records are to be protected from disclosure subject to 
certain exceptions). 
 70. Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act of 1996 (HIPAA), Pub. L. No. 
104-191, 110 Stat. 1936 (including rulemaking authority for the Secretary of Health and 
Human Services to protect patient privacy). Some states have more comprehensive medical 
privacy statutes. See, e.g., Texas’ Medical Privacy Act, TEX. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE  
ANN. §§ 181.001-181.254 (West 2015).  
 71. Cable Communications Policy Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-549, 98 Stat. 2779 (in-
cluding a provision for protecting cable subscriber information). 
 72. Video Privacy Protection Act of 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-618, 102 Stat. 3195 (protect-
ing the privacy of records maintained by video tape rental providers). 
 73. Children’s Online Privacy Protection Act of 1998, Pub. L. No. 105-277, 112 Stat. 
2681-728 (regulating the collection of child-related personal data). 
 74. CAN-SPAM Act of 2003, Pub. L No. 108-187, 117 Stat. 2699 (regulating transmis-
sions of unsolicited e-mail messages). 
 75. Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act of 1999, Pub. L. No. 106-102, 113 Stat. 1338 (including 
privacy protections for the customers of financial institutions). 
 76. Privacy Act of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-579, 88 Stat. 1896 (establishing standards for 
the collection, disclosure, and maintenance of private information). 
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cies’ rights to gather information: the Right to Financial Privacy Act 
requires subpoenas or warrants to obtain financial records;77 the For-
eign Intelligence Surveillance Act restricts the gathering of foreign 
intelligence within the United States;78 and the Privacy Protection 
Act limits the government’s ability to search press records.79 
 In a number of federal statutes, however, Congress provided signif-
icant authorization to government agencies to collect information. For 
example, financial institutions80 and telecommunication providers81 
are legally forced to assist in certain investigations by government 
agencies. Perhaps most importantly, after the terrorist attacks on the 
United States in September 2001, Congress passed the USA PATRIOT 
Act, which authorized surveillance and other “tools” for collecting pri-
vate information in order to “[i]ntercept and [o]bstruct [t]errorism.”82 
3.   Constitutional Law 
 Of course, government collection of information raises constitu-
tional issues.83 More than a century before Warren and Brandeis’s 
article on torts and the right to be let alone, the Constitution provid-
ed a right to be let alone from government searches. The Fourth 
Amendment provides that “[t]he right of the people to be secure in 
their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable 
searches and seizures, shall not be violated . . . .”84 That is, without a 
warrant, a search may not be conducted if it would violate a reasona-
ble expectation of privacy.85 The Fifth Amendment protects people 
from being forced to communicate incriminating information about 
                                                                                                                  
 77. Right to Financial Privacy Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-630, 92 Stat. 3697 (prohibiting 
access to financial records generally but providing procedures for law enforcement access). 
 78. Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978 (FISA), Pub. L. No. 95-511, 92 Stat. 
1783 (regulating the collection of foreign intelligence through electronic surveillance within 
the United States). 
 79. Privacy Protection Act of 1980, Pub. L. No. 96-440, 94 Stat. 1879 (restricting the 
Government’s ability to search and seize the work product of the press). 
 80. Currency and Foreign Transactions Reporting (Bank Secrecy) Act, Pub. L. No. 91-
508, 84 Stat. 1118 (1970) (requiring financial institutions to maintain records so as to aid 
governmental investigations). 
 81. Communications Assistance for Law Enforcement Act, Pub. L. No. 103-414, 108 
Stat. 4279 (1994) (requiring telecommunication carriers to assist law enforcement in legal 
electronic surveillance).   
 82. USA PATRIOT Act of 2001, Pub. L. No. 107-56, 115 Stat. 272. In June 2015, the 
USA FREEDOM Act extended USA PATRIOT Act authorizations. USA FREEDOM Act of 
2015, Pub. L. No. 114-23, 129 Stat. 268. 
 83. While the discussion here is on federal issues, some state constitutions expressly 
protect privacy. See, e.g., ALASKA CONST. art. I, § 22; CAL CONST. art. I, § 1; HAW. CONST. 
art. I, §§ 6, 7; WASH. CONST. art. I, § 7. 
 84. U.S. CONST. amend. IV.  
 85. Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 353 (1967) (finding that an FBI wiretap of a 
telephone booth conversation violated one’s reasonable expectation of privacy and thus 
violated the Fourth Amendment). 
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themselves.86 The First Amendment guarantees the right to keep se-
cret from the government one’s membership in or support of certain 
groups.87 More generally, the Supreme Court has said that the right 
to privacy is “older than the Bill of Rights” and that the various 
guarantees of these rights “create zones of privacy.”88 The Supreme 
Court has found these zones of privacy to protect the decisions of in-
dividuals with respect to activities such as contraception,89 abortion,90 
and homosexual intercourse.91 In addition to recognizing the interest 
in independently making decisions in personal matters such as these, 
the Supreme Court has also recognized a privacy right in “avoiding 
disclosure of personal matters.”92 However, the conditions and limits 
of this constitutional right to information privacy “has been infre-
quently examined; as a result its contours remain less than clear.”93 
B.   The Value of Privacy 
 It is important to appreciate the variety of protections and regu-
lations the law provides for privacy, but it is also important to ap-
preciate the greater good those protections and regulations promote. 
As a legal matter, depending on the circumstances, the right to pri-
vacy is the right to seclusion, the right not to be embarrassed, the 
right to be secure against government searches, or the right to 
make personal decisions. Legally, privacy rights tend to be ex-
pressed as an individual’s right against other individuals or against 
government agents. However, despite these expressions, many pri-
vacy scholars tend not to articulate privacy merely individualistical-
ly. They value privacy for its protection of individual dignity, devel-
opment, and autonomy but also emphasize that these, in turn, pro-
                                                                                                                  
 86. See U.S. CONST. amend. V; see also infra notes 155-56 and accompanying text.  
 87. Shelton v. Tucker, 364 U.S. 479, 490 (1960) (compelling teachers to divulge mem-
bership in or contributions to organizations would violate right to freedom of association); 
NAACP v. Alabama, 357 U.S. 449, 466 (1958) (finding that compulsion of NAACP member-
ship records violated the right to freedom of association).  
 88. Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 484, 486 (1965) (finding the prohibition of 
contraceptives to be an unconstitutional violation of marital privacy). 
 89. Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438, 443 (1972) (limiting contraception to married 
persons violated Equal Protection Clause); Griswold, 381 U.S. at 485-86. 
 90. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 164 (1973) (holding that the Due Process Clause in-
cludes the right to terminate pregnancy in certain situations). 
 91. Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 578-79 (2003) (finding the criminalization of 
certain homosexual acts violated one’s right to private, consensual sexual activity). 
 92. Whalen v. Roe, 429 U.S. 589, 599 (1977) (acknowledging constitutional privacy 
interests in prescription information but found no violation by statute requiring that per-
sonal information be archived).  
 93. Davis v. Bucher, 853 F.2d 718, 719 (9th Cir. 1988); see also Nixon v. Adm’r of Gen. 
Servs., 433 U.S. 425, 465 (1977) (acknowledging the President’s constitutional privacy in-
terest in certain records but finding it had not been violated). 
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vide societal benefits. The following text first mentions privacy crit-
ics and then samples privacy scholars’ approaches. 
1.   Privacy Critics 
 Not everyone is a privacy advocate. Those who criticize the con-
cern for privacy often equate it with, and limit it to, a concern for se-
crecy. For some, this concern is out of date in a world dominated by 
information technology. Facebook CEO, Mark Zuckerberg, has said 
that the age of privacy is dead as the social norm for keeping infor-
mation secret has evolved.94 More scholarly critics of the concern for 
privacy equate it with the ability to hide bad things, be it bad facts or 
bad acts. Judge Richard Posner has emphasized that privacy as se-
crecy is the concealment of true facts about oneself, especially “dis-
creditable information” such as immoral or criminal conduct.95 He 
has further argued that “[v]ery few people want to be let alone.”96 In-
stead, he believes they want to manipulate others through “selective 
disclosure of facts about themselves.”97 Whereas Judge Posner has 
focused on privacy as the opportunity to gain from deceiving others 
about oneself, Catherine MacKinnon has focused on privacy as the 
opportunity for men to oppress women.98 This oppression is possible 
because privacy shields the oppressor, making him unaccountable for 
his actions.99 For critics of privacy like Posner and MacKinnon, the 
argument is that only the guilty need secrets, and those with nothing 
to hide have no reason to be concerned for privacy. 
2.   Privacy Promotes Personal Thriving 
 In their article, Warren and Brandeis described privacy as a way 
of protecting an individual’s personality, which Edward Bloustein 
                                                                                                                  
 94. Bobbie Johnson, Privacy No Longer a Societal Norm, Says Facebook  
Founder, GUARDIAN, (Jan. 10, 2010), http://www.theguardian.com/technology/2010/jan/11/ 
facebook-privacy [https://perma.cc/7M96-29MC]. But see Madeline Stone, Tech Billionaires 
Are Paying Hundreds of Millions to Get Their Privacy Back, BUSINESS INSIDER (May 16, 
2015, 8:14 AM), http://www.businessinsider.com/wealthy-tech-execs-will-go-to-great-lengths-
to-protect-their-privacy-2015-5?utm_source=slate&utm_medium=referral&utm_term=partner  
[https://perma.cc/XJ2A-8SQT] (reporting Facebook CEO Mark Zuckerberg’s purchase of 
large parcels of land as private getaway). 
 95. Richard A. Posner, The Right to Privacy, 12 GA. L. REV. 393, 399 (1978) (arguing 
that a common business motivation for privacy is taking advantage of others’ lack  
of information). 
 96. Id. at 400. 
 97. Id. 
 98. CATHARINE A. MACKINNON, TOWARD A FEMINIST THEORY OF THE STATE 168 (1989) 
(arguing that for men, the private sphere is one of freedom, whereas for women, it  
is subordination). 
 99. Id.  
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interpreted as protecting the individual’s dignity and integrity.100 
Echoing Warren and Brandeis describing the protection of an indi-
vidual’s inner life as the mark of advanced civilization, Robert Post 
has said that privacy safeguards the rules of civility.101 He says it 
promotes forms of respect for individuals within the community.102 
Julie Cohen has related privacy to “respect for the fundamental dig-
nity of persons.”103 Anita Allen has connected privacy with spiritual 
personality, political freedom, and health and welfare.104 
 On another level of description, Ruth Gavison has said that “[o]ur 
interest in privacy” is our interest in determining “the extent to 
which we are known to others.”105 Alan Westin has said that privacy 
is what affords space for relief from the multiple roles an individual 
plays socially, no one of which can be played “indefinitely, without 
relief.”106 Hannah Arendt wrote that without this relief, without a 
“reliable hiding place from the common public world . . . from being 
seen and being heard,” a person’s life becomes “shallow.”107  
 Julie Cohen describes privacy as a “freedom from scrutiny and 
categorization” that serves “vital individual and collective ends.”108 It 
is “shorthand for breathing room” in self-development.109 It is within 
this breathing room, this zone of privacy, that individuals are ena-
bled to “develop and exercise” meaningful autonomy.110 Without 
meaningful privacy zones, Daniel Solove points out that individuals 
                                                                                                                  
 100. Edward J. Bloustein, Privacy as an Aspect of Human Dignity: An Answer to Dean 
Prosser, 39 N.Y.U. L. REV. 962, 974, 1000-03 (1964) (arguing all privacy torts should be 
understood as a common affront to human dignity). 
 101. See generally Robert C. Post, The Societal Foundations of Privacy: Community 
and Self in the Common Law Tort, 77 CALIF. L. REV. 957 (1989) (arguing a key function of 
privacy is to strengthen civility).  
 102. Id. at 957. 
 103. Julie E. Cohen, Examined Lives: Informational Privacy and the Subject as Object, 
52 STAN. L. REV. 1373, 1423 (2000) (arguing for informational privacy premised upon  
individual autonomy). 
 104. Anita L. Allen, Coercing Privacy, 40 WM. & MARY L. REV. 723, 738 (1999) (setting 
out a feminist critique of privacy but concluding in favor of a reconstructed liberal concep-
tion of privacy).  
 105. Ruth Gavison, Privacy and the Limits of Law, 89 YALE L.J. 421, 423 (1980) (argu-
ing that privacy is the limitation of accessibility to individuals, which promotes “liberty, 
autonomy, selfhood, and human relations, and furthering . . . free society.”).  
 106. Alan F. Westin, Science, Privacy, and Freedom: Issues and Proposals for the 
1970’s, 66 COLUM. L. REV. 1003, 1024 (1966). 
 107. HANNAH ARENDT, THE HUMAN CONDITION 71 (1958). 
 108. Cohen, supra note 103, at 1423. 
 109. Julie E. Cohen, What Privacy is for, 126 HARV. L. REV. 1904, 1906 (2013) (arguing 
that privacy must be understood as dynamic, subjective, and essential to democracy 
through the lens of surveillance, and that the challenges of technology must be addressed 
by a new liberal conception of privacy).  
 110. Cohen, supra note 103, at 1373. 
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become inhibited, self-censor, suffer embarrassment, and experience 
“powerlessness, vulnerability, and dehumanization.”111 
3.   Societal Benefits of Privacy 
 Julie Cohen argues not only that protecting privacy is a way of 
protecting an individual’s autonomy, development, and peace-of-
mind, but also that these redound to the benefit of a free society 
through the flourishing of expression, innovation, experimentation,112 
informed and reflective citizenship, a vital intellectual culture,113and 
a check on the powers of institutions that otherwise would invade 
privacy.114 A free society, she warns, “ignores privacy at its peril.”115 
 Julie Cohen is not alone in emphasizing the role of privacy in a 
free society. “Privacy is an issue of power,” Daniel Solove has said.116 
Jed Rubenfeld has described the right to privacy as the “fundamental 
freedom not to have one’s life too totally determined by a progressive-
ly more normalizing state,” and warned that privacy protects against 
a “creeping totalitarianism, an unarmed occupation of individuals’ 
lives.”117 Alan Westin has related privacy, autonomy, and democracy 
this way: 
 The autonomy that privacy protects . . . is particularly important 
in democratic societies, since qualities of independent thought, di-
versity of views, and nonconformity are considered desirable traits 
for individuals. Such independence requires time for sheltered ex-
perimentation and testing of ideas, for preparation and practice in 
thought and conduct, without fear of ridicule or penalty, and for the 
opportunity to alter opinions before making them public. The indi-
vidual’s sense that it is he who decides when to ‘go public’ is a cru-
cial aspect of his feeling of autonomy. Without such time for incuba-
tion and growth, through privacy, many ideas and positions would 
be launched into the world with dangerous prematurity.118 
                                                                                                                  
 111. Daniel J. Solove, Privacy and Power: Computer Databases and Metaphors for 
Information Privacy, 53 STAN. L. REV. 1393, 1393 (2001). 
 112. Cohen, supra note 109, at 1906. 
 113. Id. at 1905-06. 
 114. Cohen, supra note 103, at 1423. 
 115. Cohen, supra note 109, at 1905-06. 
 116. Daniel J. Solove, Conceptualizing Privacy, 90 CALIF. L. REV. 1087, 1143 (2002) 
(arguing that the academic commentary on privacy is unsatisfactory in that it looks for 
essential characteristics of privacy and proposing a new framework with a pragmatic ap-
proach that emphasizes the context of privacy and a bottom up approach to understanding 
the term). 
 117. Jed Rubenfeld, The Right of Privacy, 102 HARV. L. REV. 737, 784 (1989) (arguing 
for an affirmative conception of privacy that looks to consequences rather than prohibitions 
and emphasizing that legal impositions can so alter an individual’s life as to be seen  
as totalitarian). 
 118. Westin, supra note 106, at 1023.  
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 In contrast to those critics like Mark Zuckerberg who describe pri-
vacy as irrelevant, or critics like Judge Posner and Catherine 
McKinnon who emphasize it as shield for the guilty, there are many 
advocates who emphasize the societal good privacy furthers. As Dan-
iel Solove has summarized it, privacy “fosters self-creation, inde-
pendence, autonomy, creativity, imagination, counter-culture, free-
dom of thought, and reputation.”119 It benefits a society to protect 
zones in which individuals can flourish with limited intrusion.120 
Without privacy protection, he argues, individual activities that con-
tribute to the greater public good are impeded.121 Privacy protection 
is not an individualistic agenda.122 Anita Allen has said that it is “a 
precondition of a liberal egalitarian society,” and that the “variety of 
ways our lives are being emptied of privacy” are a threat to political 
liberalism itself.123 Emphasizing the role of privacy in the “democratic 
order,” Paul Schwartz has said that our task in the information tech-
nology age is to develop privacy standards that are capable of struc-
turing information use in a way that supports, rather than under-
mines “deliberative democracy” and the “individual capacity for  
self-determination.”124 
4.   Assessing Privacy Harms  
 In order to think about protecting privacy in ways that support 
democracy and the capacity for self-determination, it is helpful to 
clearly define what protecting privacy looks like in practice. While a 
philosophical appreciation of privacy may be motivational, a practical 
analysis of privacy requires a more detailed and contextual approach. 
What are the specific situations in which we should expect privacy 
harms to arise?  
 Ryan Calo has argued that “the vast majority of privacy harms fall 
into just two categories.”125 The first, subjective category “describes 
unwelcome mental states,” such as anxiety, embarrassment, or un-
                                                                                                                  
 119. Solove, supra note 116, at 1145-46. 
 120. Daniel J. Solove, “I’ve Got Nothing to Hide” and Other Misunderstandings of Pri-
vacy, 44 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 745, 762 (2007) (critiquing the common argument that law-
abiding individuals do not suffer when surveilled and proposing a theory of multidimen-
sional privacy with inherent societal value).  
 121. Daniel J. Solove, A Taxonomy of Privacy, 154 U. PA. L. REV. 477, 488 (2006) (pro-
posing a taxonomy in which privacy is not a unified notion but involves different,  
specific activities). 
 122. Id. at 487-89. 
 123. Allen, supra note 104, at 740, 755. 
 124. Paul M. Schwartz, Privacy and Democracy in Cyberspace, 52 VAND. L. REV 1609, 
1658 (1999) (arguing that privacy is integral to civil society and that new technologies like 
the internet have tremendous potential for civic and political engagement but also risks). 
 125. M. Ryan Calo, The Boundaries of Privacy Harm, 86 IND. L.J. 1131, 1133 (2011) (ar-
guing privacy harms fall within two related but distinct categories: subjective and objective).  
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ease.126 The second, objective category involves the unanticipated 
“negative, external actions justified by reference to personal infor-
mation.”127 This second type of harm is experienced when a person is 
a victim of identity theft, gossip, or an inappropriate government ac-
tion based on data mining.128 The first type of harm includes fear 
over losing control of private information, while the second type in-
cludes the adverse consequences that may come from losing control of  
the information.129 
 Daniel Solove’s approach to categorizing privacy harms is to iden-
tify all of the kinds of “socially recognized privacy violations,” accept-
ing their diversity rather than attempting to simplify or reduce the 
categories.130 His categorization is of activities related to “(1) infor-
mation collection, (2) information processing, (3) information dissem-
ination, and (4) invasion.”131 Within these four basic groups, he iden-
tifies sixteen types of privacy harms.132 For example, information col-
lection by surveillance makes individuals uncomfortable; inhibits 
their freedom, creativity, and self-development; and may increase the 
power of the policing government over the individuals in an undesir-
able way.133 Information processing problems include data insecurity, 
which increases the risk of problems like identity theft,134 and exclu-
sion problems, which arise when an individual is powerless to review 
or correct his or her personal information being collected.135 Infor-
mation processing problems also arise from aggregation, which is 
when bits of information held by various parties are combined by a 
single party into a more complete picture than any of the bits re-
vealed.136 Information dissemination problems arise, for example, 
when there is a breach of confidentiality, a harmful disclosure of 
truthful information, a dissemination of misleading information, or 
merely an increase in the accessibility of information about an indi-
vidual.137 Problematically invasive activities are unwelcome intru-
sions138 which destroy solitude and rest, cause discomfort and unease, 
and interfere with inherently personal decisions.139 
                                                                                                                  
 126. Id. 
 127. Id. 
 128. Id. at 1143. 
 129. Id. 
 130. Solove, supra note 118, at 483. 
 131. Id. at 489. 
 132. Id. at 490-91. 
 133. Id. at 490, 493-95.  
 134. Id. at 488, 490.  
 135. Id. at 490. 
 136. Id. at 507. 
 137. Id. at 491. 
 138. Id. at 491, 556. 
 139. Id. at 491, 557. 
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 III. TAXATION AND CONFIDENTIALITY 
 The tax law’s provisions on privacy aim to maintain the confiden-
tiality of taxpayer information. In the early twentieth century, there 
were occasional legislative debates on the benefits of confidentiality 
versus publicity in terms of promoting compliance. Tax scholars in-
terested in privacy have tended to explore these historical debates, 
often calling for publicizing some taxpayer information. The following 
is an overview of the tax law’s confidentiality requirements, the his-
tory thereof, and related scholarship. 
A.   Contemporary Law 
 The IRS has expansive legal authority to collect information relat-
ed to tax liabilities. It collects information both from taxpayers and 
third parties—such as employers and banks. Once collected, the in-
formation is legally protected from inappropriate disclosure and use. 
The protections are enforced through both civil and criminal sanc-
tions. The following summarizes the laws on collecting and protecting 
tax information. 
1.   Collection of Information 
 The IRS has extraordinary authority to collect and examine in-
formation. It is entitled to any information potentially relevant to 
determining any tax liability.140 The information necessary to deter-
mine an individual’s tax liability includes all information relevant in 
determining whether a receipt or benefit is includible in or excludible 
from income, whether an expense is deductible from income, and 
which, if any, credits reduce liability.141 Whether certain information 
is relevant is determined by the interplay of the Internal Revenue 
Code (“IRC”), Treasury Regulations, administrative rulings, IRS pub-
lications, and court cases.142 The information required can be simple, 
                                                                                                                  
 140. I.R.C. § 7602 (2012) (examination of books and witnesses); I.R.C. § 7801 (authority 
of Treasury Department); I.R.C. § 7803 (authority of IRS Commissioner).  
 141. See I.R.C. § 61 (defining gross income); I.R.C. § 63 (defining taxable income); 
I.R.C. §§ 51-53 (tax excluded from income); I.R.C. §§ 101-140 (defining exclusions from 
income); I.R.C. §§ 161-210 (deductions against income). 
 142. For example, section 213 provides specific requirements for deducting medical 
expenses. The Treasury Regulations require submission of whatever medical expense in-
formation “the district director may deem necessary.” Treas. Reg. § 1.213-1(h) (as amended 
in 1979). A special 35-page publication amplifies what information is necessary. See 
INTERNAL REVENUE SERV., PUBLICATION 502: MEDICAL AND DENTAL EXPENSES (2012). IRS 
administrative rulings address specific situations. See, e.g., Rev. Rul. 55-261, 1955-1 C.B. 
307, at 11 (providing that health club fees may be deductible if prescribed for alleviation of 
specific ailment). Courts also address specific situations. See, e.g., O’Donnabhain v. 
Comm’r, 134 T.C. 34, 73 (2010) (finding a breast augmentation was merely cosmetic and 
not a deductible expense for treating gender identity disorder). 
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such as the amount of a paycheck;143 or complex, such as the motiva-
tion for taking a trip144 or making a transfer.145 Some information is 
strictly required for determining taxable income, such as an asset’s 
sale price.146 Other information is required only for optional safe har-
bors, such as those for excluding gain from the sale of a home.147 While 
some relevant information is public, such as one’s home address, other 
information is private, such as one’s medical information.148 
 The IRS collects information from taxpayers and third parties. 
Taxpayers are obligated to maintain adequate records, making them 
available to the IRS.149 Third parties report information on 97% of 
taxpayers.150 The IRS can also summon information from third par-
ties, including a taxpayer’s accountant or lawyers.151 Neither the at-
torney-client nor the accountant-client privilege152 protect infor-
mation provided to the professional to prepare a return.153 The 
Fourth Amendment does not protect any information provided by a 
third party, including a lawyer or an accountant.154 Nor does the 
                                                                                                                  
 143. I.R.C. § 61 (gross income includes compensation for services). 
 144. I.R.C. § 162(a)(2); Treas. Reg. § 1.162-2(a)(2) (1960) (providing that the deductibil-
ity of expenses for travel fares, meals, and lodging, etc., depends on the primary purpose of 
the trip as business or personal). 
 145. Comm’r v. Duberstein, 363 U.S. 278, 285 (1960) (holding the exclusion under 
I.R.C. § 102 requires that a transferor’s motive be “detached and disinterested generosity”). 
 146. I.R.C. § 1001 (determination of gain or loss on asset disposition). 
 147. See, e.g., Treas. Reg. § 1.121-3 (providing safe harbors for reduced exclusion when 
a taxpayer fails general requirements). 
 148. See I.R.C. § 213; see also supra note 142 (discussing medical deductions). 
 149. The Treasury Secretary is authorized to require whatever returns, statements, 
and records are necessary to determine whether or not an individual has a tax liability, 
and, if so, whatever additional returns, records, and statements are prescribed by the Sec-
retary. See I.R.C. § 6001; Treas. Reg. § 1.6001-1(a); Boris I. Bittker, MARTIN J. MCMAHON, 
JR. & LAWRENCE A. ZELENAK, FEDERAL INCOME TAXATION OF INDIVIDUALS ¶ 39.01[8] (3d 
ed. 2002 & Supp. 2013). 
 150. 1 NAT’L TAXPAYER ADVOCATE, 2012 ANNUAL REPORT TO CONGRESS 181 (2012). 
Many third parties are required to routinely provide information: for example, a taxpayer’s 
employer is required to provide payroll information to the IRS. I.R.C. § 6051. Corporations 
are required to provide dividend payment information. I.R.C. § 6042(a), (c). Finally, those 
receiving business-related payments of more than $10,000 must provide information about 
the payment and payor. Treas. Reg. § 1.6050I-1(e)(2). 
 151. Under section 7602 of the Code, the IRS may summon any information that is 
potentially relevant to a tax liability. United States v. Arthur Young & Co., 465 U.S. 805, 
814 (1984).  
 152. I.R.C. § 7525 (providing confidentiality privileges relating to taxpayer communications). 
 153. United States v. Davis, 636 F.2d 1028, 1043-44 (5th Cir. 1981) (finding communi-
cations related to preparation of returns not privileged); see also United States v. Brown, 
478 F.2d 1038, 1040-41 (7th Cir. 1973) (explaining accounting firms documents generally 
may be compelled because they are not covered by work product doctrine or attorney-client 
privilege); MCMAHON & ZELENAK, supra note 149, ¶ 47.02[2][b].  
 154. When a document is held by a third party, there is no expectation of privacy. 
Couch v. United States, 409 U.S. 322, 332-34 (1973) (finding no legitimate expectation of 
privacy for tax records held by accountant). 
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Fifth Amendment.155 Even with respect to information held only  
by the taxpayer, Fifth Amendment protection is very limited in the  
tax context.156 
2.   Confidentiality of Information  
 IRC section 6103 is the primary taxpayer confidentiality provision 
in the tax law. Its general rule is that tax return information is confi-
dential. “Return information” is defined broadly, including virtually 
any information held by the IRS.157 With few exceptions, return infor-
mation may be used only for tax purposes.158 The exceptions include 
conditional disclosures to the President,159 congressional committees,160 
and to law enforcement agents.161 Unauthorized disclosure or use of 
return information is subject to both civil and criminal sanctions.162 
B.   Legal History 
 Section 6103 was enacted in 1976 in light of the dawning govern-
ment database age and in the shadows of President Nixon’s scandal-
ous misuse of taxpayer information.163 For the most part, between 
1918 and 1976, the Treasury Secretary was authorized to set the 
terms for disseminating tax information.164 Before 1918, and in a lim-
ited period after 1918, some tax information was publicly available as 
                                                                                                                  
 155. There is no Fifth Amendment protection for records held by accountants or law-
yers. See generally Fisher v. United States, 425 U.S. 391 (1976) (compelling lawyer with 
tax records); Couch, 409 U.S. at 322. 
 156. The Fifth Amendment is no defense for failing to file a return, though a taxpayer 
may claim privilege as to specific questions concerning a return. See 3 WHITE COLLAR 
CRIME § 19:93, Westlaw (2d ed. database updated July 2016); see also JOHN A. TOWNSEND 
ET AL., TAX CRIMES 310-12 (2d ed. 2015). See generally Garner v. United States, 424 U.S. 
648 (1976) (incriminating disclosures of gambling). Privilege for records related to a return 
is also limited. United States v. Doe, 465 U.S. 605, 612 (1984) (finding no privilege for vol-
untarily prepared records).  
 157. I.R.C. § 6103(b)(2) (providing that “return information” is any information held by 
the IRS relating to a return or any possibility of liability). This definition “has evolved to 
include virtually any information collected by the [IRS] regarding a person’s tax liability.” 
Allan Karnes & Roger Lirely, Striking Back at the IRS: Using Internal Revenue Code Pro-
visions to Redress Unauthorized Disclosures of Tax Returns or Return Information, 23 
SETON HALL L. REV. 924, 933 (1993) (arguing that §§ 6103 and 7431 have been effective to 
achieve confidentiality of return information).  
 158. See, e.g., I.R.C. § 6103(1) (addressing disclosures to agencies such as the Social 
Security Administration and Department of Labor, and for purposes such as child support 
enforcement).  
 159. I.R.C. § 6103(g). 
 160. I.R.C. § 6103(f) (addressing disclosures made to the Committee on Ways and 
Means, Committee on Finance, and Joint Committee on Taxation, for example). 
 161. I.R.C. § 6103(d) (addressing disclosures as part of federal/state information ex-
change); I.R.C. § 6103(h) (addressing disclosures to law enforcement).  
 162. I.R.C. § 7431(a) (civil penalties); I.R.C. § 7213A(b) (criminal penalties). 
 163. See infra notes 198-99. 
 164. See infra notes 196-97. 
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a matter of statute; during the Great Depression, when the income 
tax targeted only financial elites, there was a movement to publicize 
more tax information, but it was defeated after a brief success.165  
1.   Civil War, the Great Depression, the Computer Age, and  
Watergate 
 The first federal income tax was enacted when the Civil War be-
gan.166 Although replaced before effective, the Revenue Act of 1861 
made publicity of an assessed tax a condition for imposing a lien on 
property or other sources of income.167 The Revenue Act of 1862 ad-
dressed publicity more specifically, requiring that assessors advertise 
in newspapers and by public posting when and where “lists, valua-
tions, and enumerations” were available to examine.168 This notified 
taxpayers of the amount they owed, the place and time to pay, and 
the collector’s authority to collect.169 It was publicity for communica-
tion’s sake, not publicity’s sake.170 In 1864, Congress authorized the 
public inspection of income tax returns.171 Some members thought 
the publicity would assist in revenue collection, and many newspa-
pers opined that it would increase the honesty of both tax collectors  
and taxpayers.172 
 Within a few years, however, the sentiment reversed. The New 
York Times opined that “a properly organized revenue force” would not 
need to publicize tax information.173 In 1872, in part due to opposition 
                                                                                                                  
 165. See infra notes 185-89. 
 166. See (Revenue) Act of Aug. 5, 1861, ch. 45, § 49, 12 Stat. 309 (repealed 1862). 
 167. Id. (“[T]axes, when so assessed and made public, shall become a lien on the prop-
erty or other sources of said income for the amount of the same . . . .”).  
 168. (Revenue) Act of July 1, 1862, ch. 119, § 15, 12 Stat. 437. Newspaper advertise-
ments and especially public postings (for example, on courthouse doors) were the most 
practical means of communication. HOWARD M. ZARITSKY, CONG. RES. SERV., HJ5001A, 
LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF TAX RETURN CONFIDENTIALITY: SECTION 6103 OF THE INTERNAL 
REVENUE CODE OF 1954 AND ITS PREDECESSORS 4 (1974).  
 169. OFFICE OF COMM’R OF INTERNAL REVENUE, HISTORY OF THE INTERNAL REVENUE 
SERVICE: 1791-1929, at 5 (1930); CONG. GLOBE, 37th Cong., 2d Sess. 1258-59 (1862) (state-
ment of Rep. Porter). 
 170. The purpose was giving the taxpayer “time to collect his money in order to be 
ready when the collector arrives.” CONG. GLOBE, 37th Cong., 2d Sess. 1259 (1862) (state-
ment of Rep. Porter). 
 171. SEC’Y OF THE TREASURY, 38TH CONG., 1ST SESS., REPORT OF THE SECRETARY OF THE 
TREASURY ON THE STATE OF THE FINANCES FOR THE YEAR ENDING JUNE 30, 1863, 70 (1863).  
 172. INTERNAL REVENUE SERV., PUBLICATION 4639: DISCLOSURE & PRIVACY LAW 
REFERENCE GUIDE 1-2 (2012); REPORT ON ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEDURES OF THE INTERNAL 
REVENUE SERVICE, S. DOC. NO. 94-266, ch. 6, at 821-1028 (1975); Richard D. Pomp, The 
Disclosure of State Corporate Income Tax Data: Turning the Clock Back to the Future, 22 
CAP. U. L. REV. 373, 381-82 (1993) (outlining the historical debates surrounding the public-
ity of tax information). Some journalists argued that the 1862 Act’s publicity requirement 
would help wartime collection by enabling neighbors to spy and look out for government 
interests, but there is no record that Congress agreed. ZARITSKY, supra note 168, at 6-89. 
 173. Pomp, supra note 172, at 382-83.  
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to the publicity of tax information, Congress allowed the income tax 
law to expire.174 In 1894, when Congress next enacted an income tax 
amendment, it prohibited disclosing tax return information.175 
 In 1909, publicizing tax return information was debated by Con-
gress, but only for corporate taxpayers.176 Publicity was considered a 
means of regulating corporations, specifically addressing a wide-
spread problem of stock-watering.177 The resulting legislation provid-
ed that corporate tax information would be publicly available on 
terms issued by the Treasury Secretary.178 Those terms, it turned 
out, allowed shareholders of the corporation access to this infor-
mation and, if the corporation was public, to anyone.179 
 The Sixteenth Amendment, which would constitutionalize the in-
dividual income tax, was debated by Congress in the same 1909 ses-
sion. While corporate and individual taxes were legislatively distinct, 
as a practical matter, their consideration was fused.180 In 1913, fol-
lowing passage of the Sixteenth Amendment, Congress imposed an 
income tax on the top 2% of Americans.181 It carried the same publici-
ty provisions of the corporate tax, allowing the Treasury Secretary to 
decide the terms of access to taxpayer information.182 The Treasury 
Secretary declined to allow public access to individual tax infor-
mation, but did allow federal agencies access.183   
 On occasion, Congress would again debate publicizing tax infor-
mation. In 1918, Congress decided to require the names of tax return 
                                                                                                                  
 174. See REPORT ON ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEDURES OF THE INTERNAL REVENUE 
SERVICE, supra note 166, at 838; Pomp, supra note 172, at 383.  
 175. Revenue Act of August 27, 1894, ch. 349, § 34, 28 Stat. 509, 557-58. The Revenue 
Act of 1894 was held unconstitutional by the Supreme Court in Pollock v. Farmers’  
Loan & Trust Co., 157 U.S. 429 (1895). 
 176. Payne-Aldrich Tariff Act of 1909, ch. 6, 36 Stat. 11, 116. 
 177. President Taft said, “[t]o me the publicity feature of the law is the only thing 
which makes the law of any special value for it is not going to be a great revenue producer.” 
ROY G. BLAKEY & GLADYS C. BLAKEY, THE FEDERAL INCOME TAX 57 (1940) (quoting 
ARCHIBALD BUTT, TAFT AND ROOSEVELT: LETTERS TO HIS SISTER CLARA 262-63 (1930)); see 
also Marjorie E. Kornhauser, Corporate Regulation and the Origins of the Corporate In-
come Tax, 66 IND. L.J. 53, 54 (1990) (arguing the corporate excise tax was, in part, intend-
ed for corporate regulation). 
 178. It was unclear if Section 38 of the Payne-Aldrich Tariff Act of 1909 provided for 
public access or access only on Presidential order. See 45 CONG. REC. 4136-37 (1910) 
(statements of Reps. Smith and Fitzgerald). In 1910, Congress clarified that it was the 
latter. Act of June 17, 1910, ch. 297, 36 Stat. 468, 494. See generally PUBLICATION 4639, 
supra note 166, at 1-3; REPORT ON ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEDURES OF THE INTERNAL 
REVENUE SERVICE, supra note 166, at 821-1028; ZARITSKY, supra note 168. 
 179. The Treasury Secretary did this seven years later. T.D. 1665, 13 Treas. Dec. Int. 
Rev. 117 (1910). 
 180. See, e.g., 44 CONG. REC. 1541, 4437, 4718 (1909). 
 181. W. ELLIOT BROWNLEE, FEDERAL TAXATION IN AMERICA: A SHORT HISTORY 57 (2004). 
 182. Revenue Act of 1913, Pub. L. No. 63-16, 38 Stat. 114, 177. 
 183. T.D. 2961, 2 C.B. 250-51 (1920). 
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filers to be publicized.184 In 1924, it began requiring their addresses 
and amounts paid to be publicized too.185 But in 1925, the Treasury 
Department reported to Congress that publicity had increased costs 
and lowered revenue.186 The Treasury Secretary testified that the 
publicity provision stimulated investments in tax-exempt securities, 
decreasing tax revenue.187 Accordingly, in 1926, Congress scaled back 
the requirement, again protecting the amount paid as confidential.188  
 Within a few years, Great Depression-era resentment of the rich 
and well-publicized tax evasion scandals prompted Congress to re-
consider publicity. At this time, only the top 6% paid income tax.189 
Some politicians wanted to throw “pitiless publicity” upon “the in-
comes of the rich, the superrich, and the idle rich,” the “burglars of 
wealth, idle holders of idle capital, lounge lizards of the blue-blooded, 
and pink-toed aristocracy of wealth.”190 They argued it would deter 
evasion, reveal loopholes, and keep tax administrators honest.191 Op-
ponents argued it would make taxpayers into targets for racketeers, 
unjustly invade privacy, peace, and happiness, and move America 
towards “goose-stepping” like German Nazis.192 The proponents 
won—but only temporarily. Although the Revenue Act of 1934 al-
lowed public inspection of a taxpayer’s “Pink Slip,” the inspection 
provision was repealed before it became effective.193 
 In order to fund World War II, the income tax ceased to be a class 
tax, and was imposed on more than 30% of Americans.194 After that, 
no legislator called for publicizing more taxpayer information. The 
IRS remained authorized to release names and addresses of taxpay-
ers, which it continued to do until 1966, when both privacy concerns 
over Social Security numbers and the efforts to modernize IRS rec-
                                                                                                                  
 184. Revenue Act of 1918, ch. 18, 40 Stat. 1057, 1086 (1919).  
 185. Revenue Act of 1924, ch. 234, 43 Stat. 253, 292-93 (1924). 
 186. Revenue Revision, 1925: Hearings Before the H. Comm. on Ways & Means, 69th 
Cong. 8-9 (1925). 
 187. Cost of Publicity Scored in Treasury, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 3, 1925, at 1. 
 188. Revenue Act of 1926, ch. 27, 44 Stat. 9, 51-52 (1926). 
 189. BROWNLEE, supra note 181, at 87. In 1939, there were 3,900,000 individual tax-
payers in a U.S. population of 131,000,000; in 1945, there were 42,600,000 taxpayers in a 
population of 141,000,000.  
 190. 74 CONG. REC. 3392-93 (1935) (statement of Rep. Truax). 
 191. Pomp, supra note 172, at 399-400.  
 192. 74 CONG. REC. 2594 (1935) (statement of Rep. Beiter on making taxpayers “prey 
for racketeers” and invading their privacy, peace, and happiness); id. at 4450 (statement of 
Sen. Tydings on risk of making Americans into “goose-stepping automatons”).  
 193. Revenue Act of 1934, ch. 277, 48 Stat. 680, 698, amended by Act of April 19, 1935, 
ch. 74, 49 Stat. 158. For an account of the campaign to repeal the pink slip provisions, see 
Marjorie E. Kornhauser, Shaping Public Opinion and the Law: How a “Common Man” 
Campaign Ended a Rich Man’s Law, 73 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 123 (2010). 
 194. BROWNLEE, supra note 181, at 115. 
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ord-keeping brought the practice to an end.195 Nevertheless, taxpayer 
information continued to be used by various federal agencies other 
than the IRS. By 1974, over 20,000,000 returns were provided to oth-
er agencies each year.196  
 In 1976, this came to an end with the enactment of IRC section 
6103. Congress eliminated the authority of the Treasury Secretary to 
determine how taxpayer information would be used. This resulted 
from two broader political movements. The first was the reaction to 
President Nixon. He aroused political resentment by ordering the 
broad scale collection of tax information for statistical purposes.197 
And, of course, he aroused a great deal more resentment by accessing 
the tax information of political enemies.198  
 The second political force behind the 1976 overhaul was general 
congressional concern with how private information was being col-
lected and used. This concern had already led to the 1974 Privacy 
Act, which restricted the disclosure of personal records and provided 
individuals the right to access and correct their personal records.199 
The 1974 Privacy Act also established the U.S. Privacy Protection 
Study Commission.200 As part of this study, Congress directed the 
Privacy Commission to evaluate the dissemination and use of tax in-
formation.201 The Commission described the required “extensive dis-
closure of personal information by individual taxpayers to the IRS” 
as a “basic violation of privacy,” but limited itself to recommenda-
tions on the use and dissemination of tax information, as it had been 
charged to do.202 In June 1976, the Senate Finance Committee issued 
(substantially similar) recommendations, which became the basis for 
IRC section 6103, described above.203   
                                                                                                                  
 195. Revenue Act of 1926, ch. 27, § 257(e), 44 Stat. 9, 52; Act of Nov. 2, 1966, Pub. L. 
No. 89-713, § 4(a), 80 Stat. 1107, 1109; see also S. Rep. No. 89-1625, at 8-9 (1966). 
 196. REPORT ON ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEDURES OF THE INTERNAL REVENUE SERVICE, 
supra note 166, at 854-56; STAFF OF THE JOINT COMM. ON TAXATION, 94TH CONG., GENERAL 
EXPLANATION OF THE TAX REFORM ACT OF 1976, at 313-14 n.3 (1976). 
 197. Two House subcommittees held hearings related to the executive orders, and in 
response, President Nixon revoked both orders. PUBLICATION 4639, supra note 166, at 7-8; 
REPORT ON ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEDURES OF THE INTERNAL REVENUE SERVICE, supra note 
172, at 875-76; ZARITSKY, supra note 168, at 1. 
 198. This access was cited in the proposed Articles of Impeachment. H.R. REP. NO. 93-
1305, at 3 (1974).  
 199. U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, OFFICE OF PRIVACY AND CIVIL LIBERTIES, OVERVIEW OF 
THE PRIVACY ACT OF 1974, at 4 (2015), http://www.justice.gov/opcl/file/639731/download 
[https://perma.cc/Y29F-RDRE]. 
 200. Privacy Act of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-579, 88 Stat. 1896, 1906. The Privacy Protection 
Study Commission was established as part of the Privacy Act of 1974. 5 U.S.C. § 552a (2012). 
 201. Privacy Act of 1974, Pub. L. 93-579, 88 Stat. 1896, § 5(b)(2)(B)(ii). 
 202. PRIVACY PROT. STUDY COMM’N, PERSONAL PRIVACY IN AN INFORMATION SOCIETY 
537, 560 (1977).  
 203. For the most part, the differences between I.R.C. section 6103 as enacted and the 
Privacy Commission’s recommendations were not significant. For a review of the differ-
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2.   Historical Reflections 
 In reviewing the legislative history and debates over the past cen-
tury and a half, several points stand out. The first is the extraordi-
nary class warfare language that was part of Great Depression poli-
tics. One would be stunned to hear any American politician today de-
scribe investors as “burglars of wealth, idle holders of idle capital, 
lounge lizards of the blue-blooded, and pink-toed aristocracy of 
wealth.”204 This language highlights the fact that the income tax at 
the time was only on the wealthy. Once it became a mass tax, politi-
cal calls for publicizing tax information ceased. 
 A second point is that the argument that public access to taxpayer 
information would help criminals victimize taxpayers was prescient. 
During the Great Depression, opponents dismissed this concern. But, 
even with the confidentiality of information today, identity theft us-
ing taxpayer information remains one of the greatest problems the 
IRS has been unable to solve.205 
 A third point is that the experimental increase in publicity failed. 
Tax collections decreased and the expenses of tax administration in-
creased. The Treasury Secretary concluded that reducing privacy dis-
torted economic choices, stimulating tax-exempt investments and 
chilling taxable investments.206 Given that a principal goal of tax pol-
icy is to minimize the distortion of economic behavior, the Treasury 
Secretary’s report deserves attention as a report on a real-world ex-
periment in privacy policy.207  
 Finally, note that legislation and debates have focused on regulat-
ing the disclosure of tax information, never its collection. The con-
gressionally-appointed Privacy Commission considered the “extensive 
disclosure of personal information by individual taxpayers to the 
IRS” to be a “basic violation of privacy.”208 But it is this exceptional 
observation that highlights the absence of similar observations by 
others. Legislatively, taxpayers’ interest in privacy has been equated 
with the interest in avoiding inappropriate disclosure.  
                                                                                                                  
ences, see PRIVACY PROT. STUDY COMM’N, supra note 202, at 541-59; S. REP. NO. 94-938, at 
315-49 (1976). 
 204. 74 CONG. REC. 3392-93 (1935) (statement of Rep. Truax). 
 205. 1 NAT’L TAXPAYER ADVOCATE, 2015 ANNUAL REPORT TO CONGRESS 180-87 (2015) 
(listing identity theft as one of the top 20 “most serious problems”). 
 206. See supra note 186. 
 207. See, e.g., PHILIP D. OLIVER, TAX POLICY 1 (2d ed. 2004) (arguing that a usual crite-
rion for tax policy is the notion of “economic efficiency versus economic distortions”). 
 208. PRIVACY PROTECTION STUDY COMM’N, supra note 202, at 560. 
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C.   Contemporary Scholarship 
 Tax scholars’ interest in privacy and taxation emerged after IRC 
section 6103 was enacted in 1976. Two types emerged. The first as-
sumes the section 6103 approach of presumptive confidentiality with 
limited secondary use for government purposes. Some of this scholar-
ship takes a general approach.209 Much more of this first type of 
scholarship, however, focuses on technical aspects of the tax infor-
mation regime, usually arguing for moderate modifications.210 The 
                                                                                                                  
 209. See, e.g., Boris I. Bittker, Federal Income Tax Returns—Confidentiality vs. Public 
Disclosure, 20 WASHBURN L.J. 479 (1981) (discussing competing interests of privacy and 
publicity, noting privacy concerns have no role in determining information required to be 
disclosed to the IRS, which may share information with other agencies through  
I.R.C. § 6103); Joseph J. Darby, Confidentiality and the Law of Taxation, 46 AM. J. COMP. 
L. 577 (1998) (discussing tax confidentiality provisions within the context of a self-
assessment system); Hayes Holderness, Taxing Privacy, 21 GEO. J. POVERTY L. & POL’Y 1 
(2013) (arguing that low-income citizens are inappropriately forced to relinquish privacy 
for public assistance (including Earned Income Tax Credit) or, alternatively, be subject to a 
de facto tax by foregoing assistance to maintain privacy); Arthur R. Miller, Tax Compliance 
Versus Individual Privacy: A Conflict Between Societal Objectives, in INCOME TAX 
COMPLIANCE: A REPORT OF THE ABA SECTION OF TAXATION INVITATIONAL CONFERENCE ON 
INCOME TAX COMPLIANCE 173-85 (1983) (discussing privacy implications of technological 
advancement, then makes proposals regarding the gathering, maintenance, and use of 
personal information); Paul Schwartz, The Future of Tax Privacy, 61 NAT’L TAX J. 883 
(2008) (addressing the history of tax confidentiality provisions, arguing that tax infor-
mation is becoming less special as it is held by third parties, though securing tax infor-
mation is increasingly important); William A. Edmundson, Note, Discovery of Federal In-
come Tax Returns and the New “Qualified” Privileges, 1984 DUKE L.J. 938 (1984) (arguing 
that the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure are sufficient to prevent abuse in tax cases, and 
therefore, there is no need for special tax privilege); see also Vivian M. Raby, The Freedom 
of Information Act and the IRS Confidentiality Statute: A Proper Analysis, 54 U. CIN. L. 
REV. 605 (1985) (arguing that the tax confidentiality regime and FOIA are generally at 
odds but could be reconciled through FOIA exemptions).   
 210. See, e.g., James N. Benedict & Leslie A. Lupert, Federal Income Tax Returns—
The Tension Between Government Access and Confidentiality, 64 CORNELL L. REV. 940 
(1979) (outlining permissible uses of tax return information other than for determining tax 
liabilities); Cynthia Blum, The Flat Tax: A Panacea for Privacy Concerns?, 54 AM. U. L. 
REV. 1241 (2005) [hereinafter Blum, The Flat Tax] (arguing that current IRS information 
gathering does not raise significant privacy concerns and that a flat tax would not signifi-
cantly improve privacy as changes would mostly affect only the wealthy); Cynthia Blum, 
Sharing Bank Deposit Information with Other Countries: Should Tax Compliance or Priva-
cy Claims Prevail?, 6 FLA. TAX REV. 579 (2004) [hereinafter Blum, Sharing] (arguing that 
safeguards on tax information exchange with treaty partners would protect privacy inter-
ests); Margaret Ann Irving, Managing Information Privacy in the Information Age, 53 
ADMIN. L. REV. 659 (2001) (describing the creation of the IRS Office of the Privacy Advo-
cate and its articulation of key privacy policies and why technological advancements make 
privacy concerns more important); Karnes & Lirely, supra note 157; Michelle M. Kwon, 
Whistling Dixie About the IRS Whistleblower Program Thanks to the IRC Confidentiality 
Restrictions, 29 VA. TAX REV. 447 (2010) (suggesting balancing tax confidentiality policies 
and whistleblower program policies); Miller, supra note 209; Edward A. Morse, Whistle-
blowers and Tax Enforcement: Using Inside Information to Close the “Tax Gap,” 24 AKRON 
TAX. J. 1 (2009) (proposing changes to the whistleblower program to improve the effective-
ness of the examination function); Franziska Hertel, Note, Qui Tam for Tax?: Lessons from 
the States, 113 COLUM. L. REV. 1897 (2013) (proposing allowing qui tam lawsuits alleging 
tax fraud and arguing this would pose no greater threat to privacy than does current law); 
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second type considers a more radical use of taxpayer information. 
This scholarship echoes the 1930s ‘Pink Slip’ debate, arguing for or 
against publicity to improve tax compliance.211 
1.   Characteristics 
 Both types of scholarship tend to share five characteristics. Each 
article has at least one of these characteristics, and many have all 
five. These characteristics constitute the prevailing scholarly framing 
of tax privacy. The framework has been determined by legislative 
history and is limited to articulating policies for the use and dissemi-
nation of taxpayer information. None of it articulates a policy for  
collecting information. 
 One shared characteristic is that privacy is considered quite nar-
rowly. It tends to be equated with the right to prevent disclosure.212 
Some scholarship expresses concern for protecting against inadvert-
ent disclosure and provides for close regulation of secondary uses by 
other agencies.213 Other scholarship considers increasing disclosure 
to achieve various goals, such as greater securities regulation, whis-
tle blower programs, or privatized tax collection.214 More radical 
scholarship argues for publicizing taxpayer information in order to 
improve compliance or promote reform.215 Only one article considers 
                                                                                                                  
Christina N. Smith, Note, The Limits of Privatization: Privacy in the Context of Tax Col-
lection, 47 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 627 (1997) (discussing the privacy concerns raised by pro-
posals to privatize tax collection); see also Dennis J. Ventry, Jr., Whistleblowers and Qui 
Tam for Tax, 61 TAX LAW. 357 (2008) (arguing that private enforcement would be effective 
for tax law).   
 211. See, e.g., Joshua D. Blank, In Defense of Individual Tax Privacy, 61 EMORY L.J. 
265 (2011) (arguing that tax confidentiality improves compliance by allowing strategic 
disclosures that highlight enforcement strengths and conceal enforcement weaknesses); 
Joshua D. Blank & Daniel Z. Levin, When Is Tax Enforcement Publicized?, 30 VA. TAX 
REV. 1 (2010); Marjorie E. Kornhauser, Doing the Full Monty: Will Publicizing Tax Infor-
mation Increase Compliance?, 18 CANADIAN J.L. & JURIS. 1 (2005) (arguing that publiciz-
ing tax information would improve compliance and taxpayer education); Marc Linder, Tax 
Glasnost for Millionaires: Peeking Behind the Veil of Ignorance Along the Publicity-Privacy 
Continuum, 18 N.Y.U. REV. L. & SOC. CHANGE 951 (1990) (arguing that publicizing the tax 
information of millionaires would improve public understanding of income disparities and 
wealth inequalities); see also Stephen W. Mazza, Taxpayer Privacy and Tax Compliance, 
51 U. KAN. L. REV. 1065 (2003) (arguing for publicly identifying those who fail to pay taxes, 
criminally evade taxes, and invest in abusive shelters in order to improve overall compliance). 
 212. See, e.g., Bittker, supra note 209, at 480, 493-94; Blank, supra note 211; Blum, 
The Flat Tax, supra note 210, at 1282; Darby, supra note 209, at 587; Irving, supra note 
210, at 668; Kornhauser, supra note 211, at 5-7, 9, 17-18, 21-22; Linder, supra note 211, at 
967, 969; see also Mazza, supra note 211, at 1068, 1071. 
 213. See, e.g., Irving, supra note 210, at 668-70; Miller, supra note 209, at 179; see also 
Schwartz, supra note 209, at 884, 891.  
 214. See, e.g., Benedict & Lupert, supra note 210, at 962-64; Hertel, supra note 210, at 
1925-28; see also Kwon, supra note 210, at 475-76. 
 215. See generally Kornhauser, supra note 211; Linder, supra note 211; see also Mazza, 
supra note 211. 
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privacy more broadly than the interest in avoiding disclosure of in-
formation already collected by the IRS.216 
 A second characteristic is the focus on taxpayer compliance. The 
premise is that taxpayers provide information because they trust the 
IRS to keep it confidential.217 Often, the issue is framed as a 
tradeoff—a balancing of compliance incentives with greater disclo-
sure.218 Those arguing for greater disclosure claim it would achieve 
other goals—such as a better public understanding of the need for 
tax reform—without materially undermining compliance.219 One ar-
gument supporting the view that confidentiality may not play a sig-
nificant role in taxpayers “trusting” the IRS is that many taxpayers 
already choose to disclose private information to third parties, are 
increasingly doing so, and in some circumstances even knowingly 
have their information disclosed by third parties to the public, take 
for example, the salary information of government and public corpo-
rate employees.220 More radical scholarship denies any legitimate in-
terest in keeping tax information confidential, describing publicity as 
“citizen-oriented” and privacy as “pathology.”221 
 A third characteristic of the scholarship is its disinterest in the 
privacy interests affected by the collection of tax information. The 
scholarship is focused on the disclosure of information by the IRS, 
but not the collection of information by the IRS.222 The broad legal 
authority of the IRS to collect information is described, as are the le-
gally insufficient challenges to that authority.223 And, the need for 
the IRS to collect information in order to apply the law is noted.224 
But the scholarship is generally not concerned with articulating what 
privacy interests ought to constrain the IRS’s collection of information. 
                                                                                                                  
 216. See generally Holderness, supra note 209 (arguing that low-income citizens are 
inappropriately forced to relinquish privacy for public assistance (including EITC) or, al-
ternatively, be subject to a de facto tax by foregoing assistance to maintain privacy). 
 217. See, e.g., Blank, supra note 211, at 267-68; Blum, Sharing, supra note 210, at 605, 
609; Darby, supra note 209, at 577; Mazza, supra note 211, at 1071; see also Schwartz, 
supra note 209, at 891, 895-97, 899. 
 218. See, e.g., Blank, supra note 211, at 273; Kornhauser, supra note 211, at 7-9, 17-18, 
21-22; Linder, supra note 211, at 967; see also Mazza, supra note 211, at 1120, 1140 n.322. 
 219. See, e.g., Kornhauser, supra note 211, at 99; Linder, supra note 211, at 959-61, 
965, 969, 975, 980; Mazza, supra note 211, at 1076, 1120. 
 220. See, e.g., Kornhauser, supra note 211, at 101-02; Schwartz, supra note 209, at 883, 896.  
 221. See, e.g., Linder, supra note 211, at 965, 968-70. 
 222. See, e.g., Bittker, supra note 209, at 479; Blum, Sharing, supra note 210, at 622-
23; Darby, supra note 209, at 577; Kornhauser, supra note 211, at 101-03, 107-08, 115-16; 
Mazza, supra note 211, at 1071-75; Schwartz, supra note 209, at 891, 897-99. 
 223. See, e.g., Bittker, supra note 209, at 484, 488; Blum, Sharing, supra note 210, at 
609-12, 622-23; Blum, The Flat Tax, supra note 210, at 1255-57; Bridget J. Crawford, Tax-
ation, Pregnancy and Privacy, 16 WM. & MARY J. WOMEN & L. 327, 354, 357 (2010); 
Schwartz, supra note 209, at 897-99. 
 224. Benedict & Lupert, supra note 210, at 945; Blank, supra note 211, at 284-86; 
Linder, supra note 211, at 951-53, 967-76; Mazza, supra note 211, at 1098-1101.  
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 A fourth characteristic is describing, or at least emphasizing, tax 
information as financial information. While there is notice that in-
formation not expressible in dollar amounts is also required for tax 
reporting, the focus is almost wholly on dollar-amount information.225 
The scholarship focused on public disclosure of tax information 
equates confidentiality with concealing a taxpayer’s ability to pay 
tax, and argues for various benefits, like imminent tax reform if the 
public were shown the prevalent disconnect between financial ability 
and tax liability.226 Still, other scholarship considers why taxpayers 
prefer keeping financial information confidential, such as to avoid 
their wealth being targeted by family or criminals.227 But none of the 
scholarship focuses on the breadth and depth of non-dollar amount 
information relevant to determining liabilities. 
 A fifth characteristic is the determinative influence of tax legisla-
tion and history. No tax scholar has explored the range of privacy 
issues in taxation. Rather, the scope of the articles is limited in one of 
two ways. First, most of the articles are confined to considering pri-
vacy within the framework of IRC section 6103 and related legisla-
tion.228 Even those articles that are not technically oriented are ori-
ented solely within the section’s conceptual framework of presump-
tive confidentiality and exceptional disclosure. Second, while more 
radical articles re-consider the presumption of confidentiality, they 
do so by appealing to prior legislative debates, especially the Great 
Depression-era debates.229  
2.   Critique 
 There are several shortcomings the body of scholarship shares, to 
greater and lesser degrees. Some of the articles make significant con-
tributions, especially in popularizing legal history or bringing empiri-
cal work to bear on tax compliance issues.230 But none addresses the 
broader privacy issues in taxation. 
 The contemporary tax scholarship ignores the value of privacy as 
a topic. It expresses no concern that the expansive authority of the 
                                                                                                                  
 225. See, e.g., Bittker, supra note 209, at 482; Linder, supra note 211, at 970-71, 976; 
Miller, supra note 209, at 174; Schwartz, supra note 209, at 896-98. 
 226. See, e.g., Linder, supra note 211, at 952-53, 969, 971, 973-78, 980, 983.  
 227. See, e.g., Blum, Sharing, supra note 210, at 603-05. 
 228. See, e.g., Benedict & Lupert, supra note 210, at 941; Blank, supra note 211, at 
279; Blum, Sharing, supra note 210, at 621-22; Darby, supra note 209, at 577-78; Mazza, 
supra note 211, at 1068-69, 1092-93, 1099; Schwartz, supra note 209, at 896-99.  
 229. See, e.g., Blank, supra note 211, at 274-79; Kornhauser, supra note 211, at 101; 
Linder, supra note 211, at 952-53, 964-67, 976-79; Mazza, supra note 211, at 1088-92.  
 230. See, e.g., Blank, supra note 211 (drawing on psychological work to defend individ-
ual tax privacy in terms of increasing compliance, which is the usual grounds on which 
privacy is attacked). 
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IRS to invade taxpayers’ privacy may have negative impacts on tax-
payers’ self-development231 and autonomy,232 as well as their dignity 
and integrity.233 Nor does the scholarship express concern that this 
impact, in turn, could undermine innovation,234 citizenship, and cul-
ture.235 There is no concern that taxpayers may become inhibited, 
self-censor, suffer embarrassment, and experience “powerlessness, 
vulnerability, and dehumanization.”236 And, there is no concern that 
the inquisitions by the IRS may be inappropriate in a liberal, demo-
cratic, and free society.237 The contemporary scholarship expresses no 
concern in structuring the collection of tax information in a way that 
supports both revenue collection and privacy.  
 The contemporary scholarship tends to characterize privacy as no 
more than a hurdle to more effective tax administration. The more 
extreme scholarship tends towards being radically anti-privacy, at 
least with respect to the wealthy.238 It characterizes arguments for 
privacy as arguments to hide relevant facts. It does not consider how 
a privacy policy could guide which facts are made relevant in the law. 
Mistaking privacy as an obstacle of an improved tax system rather 
than a societal good not only presents a false dichotomy, but it ob-
scures ways in which tax law might be improved. 
 The contemporary scholarship also problematically emphasizes 
the financial components of tax information. Obviously, a tax liability 
or refund is a dollar amount. But much, if not most tax information is 
not expressible in dollar amounts. A taxpayer may receive $50, but 
whether it is includible (taxable) or excludible (non-taxable) is not a 
dollar amount issue. For example, if the transferor was motivated by 
a disinterested generosity, the $50 is excludible as a gift under the 
general rule of section 102(a).239 However, even if the motivation were 
disinterested generosity, if the transferee is an employee of the trans-
feror, the amount is taxable under the exception in section 102(c). 
But, if the employee were to receive $50 worth of “flowers, fruit, 
books, or similar property” because the employee is experiencing a 
                                                                                                                  
 231. See Cohen, supra note 109, at 1906-07. 
 232. See Cohen, supra note 103, at 1423-28.  
 233. See Bloustein, supra note 100, at 974, 1000-01. 
 234. See Cohen, supra note 109, at 1906.  
 235. Id. at 1905.  
 236. Solove, supra note 111, at 1393.  
 237. See Allen, supra note 104, at 740. 
 238. See, e.g., Linder, supra note 211, at 962 (arguing that privacy is an enemy of pro-
gressive politics); id. at 965 (arguing that publicizing tax information is citizen-oriented); 
id. at 968-69 (arguing privacy is a cult, a pathology, and a prejudice); id. at 969 (arguing 
there is “no legitimate privacy interest” in tax information and no need to accommodate 
any alleged privacy interest); id. (arguing that privacy is not a civil liberties issue). 
 239. See generally Comm’r v. Duberstein, 363 U.S. 278, 294 (1960) (interpreting  
I.R.C § 102(a) to determine whether the transfer of a Cadillac was a gift).  
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“family crisis,” then the gift would not be includible.240 It seems likely 
that the employee who received such “flowers, fruits, books, or simi-
lar property” would be stunned to learn he or she needed to substan-
tiate the crisis in order to avoid taxability. Similarly, surprise seems 
likely for a taxpayer who reports a dollar amount of medical expenses 
but is then required provide details that otherwise would be protect-
ed from government scrutiny. For example, reporting a dollar 
amount of a medical expenses related to an abortion entitles the IRS 
to collect the details relevant to determining the legality of the abor-
tion, such as the month of pregnancy at the time of the abortion.241 
Or, consider that if the taxpayer pays a Christian Science health 
practitioner, little additional information would be necessary to sub-
stantiate the deduction,242 but if the payment was to a Scientologist 
auditor or a native healer, the taxpayer may have to provide a great 
deal more information.243 The point is not that every tax return opens 
the taxpayer to inquiries into family crises, health, and religion. The 
point is that there is little part of a taxpayer’s life that may not be-
come tax relevant under certain circumstances, and the IRS is au-
thorized to demand whatever information is relevant. The dollar 
amounts reported are the tip of the iceberg. 
 The final shortcoming is the general disinterest in examining the 
consequences of collecting information.244 Taxpayers’ privacy inter-
ests are not limited to checking the government’s authority to dis-
close information. Taxpayers also have an interest in how much of 
their information is collected by the government. The current schol-
                                                                                                                  
 240. Treas. Reg. § 1.132-6(e)(1) (as amended in 1992). 
 241. IRS, Form 1040 U.S. Individual Income Tax Return (2015), 
https://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-prior/f1040--2015.pdf [https://perma.cc/8RW5-XG2L] (Line 40, 
itemized deductions); IRS, Schedule A (Form 1040) Itemized Deductions (2015), 
https://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-prior/f1040sa--2015.pdf [https://perma.cc/8YSB-LZHN] (Line 1, 
medical and dental expense). Given state law variations on legality and gestational age, 
information on gestational age is relevant. Rev. Rul. 73-201, 1973-1 C.B. 140 (deductibility 
of medical expenses of legal abortion); Rev. Rul. 97-9, 1997-1 C.B. 77 (legality essential  
to deductibility). 
 242. Payments to Christian Science practitioners have long been considered deductible 
by the IRS. Rev. Rul. 55-261, 1955-1 C.B. 307. Christian Scientists consider illness illusory, 
so their medical practitioners encourage faith. ENCYCLOPEDIA OF RELIGION 1745-48 (Lind-
say Jones ed., 2d ed. 2005). 
 243. Unlike payments to Christian Science practitioners, payments for “processing” by 
Scientologists were held not deductible. Brown v. Comm’r, 62 T.C. 551 (1974), aff'd per 
curiam, 523 F.2d 365 (8th Cir. 1975) (rejecting contention that the Tax Court erred in 
denying a tax deduction for medical expense cost of Scientology “processing”). Payments to 
native Samoan healers have also been disallowed. Tautolo v. Comm’r, 34 T.C.M. (CCH) 
1198, 1200 (1975) (finding payments to Samoan healers not deductible because not recom-
mended by other physicians, bore no relationship to specific malady, and not strongly be-
lieved to be effective). 
 244. Contra Holderness, supra note 209, at 25-32 (describing privacy harms from in-
formation collection in the context of public assistance programs, including the Earned 
Income Tax Credit (EITC)). 
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arship excludes from consideration what information is demanded 
under current law and practice, rather than considering if the law 
and practice ought to be modified. Tax policy is a mix of politics, poli-
cies, and compromises. By failing to consider the breadth, depth, and 
nature of information collected under this mix, and instead only how 
to use the information once collected, the current scholarship is una-
ble to make some very important contributions. 
 IV. PRIVACY AS A TAX POLICY 
 Since 1976, tax privacy law has provided presumptive confidenti-
ality with exceptional disclosures for tax information once it is col-
lected.245 Tax privacy scholarship has remained fixed within the legis-
lative approach, taking no note of the value of privacy except to the 
extent confidentiality incentivizes providing information.246 Tax pri-
vacy scholarship has been siloed. It has not addressed the risks of 
excessive information collection. Outside of tax scholarship, several 
privacy scholars have argued for protecting privacy because doing so 
advances other important interests such as human development, 
dignity, and the capacity for self-determination; these, in turn, con-
tribute to an innovative culture, a free society, and a deliberative 
democracy.247 Protecting individuals from excessive observation,  
scrutiny, and categorization is good not only for the individual but  
for society.248 
A.   How Systemic Dysfunction Protects Taxpayer Privacy Today 
 The law protecting privacy in tax administration has not been 
written with an eye towards protecting taxpayers from the ill effects 
of excessive information collection. The law has been written only to 
protect information from inappropriate use and dissemination. But 
no one has sounded alarms, declaring that the demand for private 
information for tax purposes is undermining the dignity or develop-
ment of Americans, American culture, or democracy. So, why is it 
that, on the one hand, tax law has so little regard for its demands of 
private information, but, on the other hand, none of the pernicious 
effects of excessive privacy demands have been reported by scholars, 
lawyers, or politicians? 
 The answer is that privacy is inadvertently protected in our tax 
system, and it is protected through the system’s dysfunction. The le-
gal authority of the IRS to collect tax-relevant information is expan-
                                                                                                                  
 245. See supra notes 197-208 and accompanying text. 
 246. See supra Section III.C.1. 
 247. See supra Part II. 
 248. See supra Part II. 
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sive, and the amount of information that is tax relevant is equally 
expansive.249 But, the funding and the human and technological re-
sources of the IRS are not.250 Taxpayer privacy has been protected by 
an under-resourced IRS that is consequently limited to auditing less 
than 1% of individual income tax returns.251 In 99% of cases, the only 
information collected by the IRS is what is provided with the return. 
With few exceptions, returns require only that the taxpayer report 
his or her conclusions—as to deductibility, for example—without re-
porting any substantiating analysis or information. Most of the in-
formation relevant for determining the correct application of the law 
to the facts is never known to the IRS. For example, a taxpayer mak-
ing a deductible charitable contribution is legally required to main-
tain records with a good deal of information.252 But almost none of 
this information is submitted to the IRS with the return.253 The tax-
payer is supposed to be prepared to provide this information to the 
IRS. But, with the miniscule audit rate, the IRS is almost certain not 
to know whether a particular taxpayer had the information—or even 
had any idea of what information was relevant. The IRS is almost cer-
tain to never know whether the contribution was properly deducted. 
 However, it is not that the IRS is so good at tax administration 
that it does not need to audit more taxpayers. Quite the contrary, 
                                                                                                                  
 249. See supra Section III.A.1. 
 250. INTERNAL REVENUE SERV. ADVISORY COUNCIL, 2014 PUBLIC REPORT 9 (2014), 
https://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-utl/2014-IRSAC-Full-Report.pdf [https://perma.cc/U2FT-R7AD]; 
U.S. TREASURY INSPECTOR GEN. FOR TAX ADMIN., DECLINING RESOURCES HAVE CONTRIBUTED 
TO UNFAVORABLE TRENDS IN SEVERAL KEY AUTOMATED COLLECTION SYSTEM BUSINESS 
RESULTS (2014), http://www.treasury.gov/tigta/auditreports/2014reports/201430080fr.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/RQA2-X2GN]; NAT’L TAXPAYER ADVOCATE, 2014 ANNUAL REPORT TO 
CONGRESS, at viii (2014), http://www.taxpayeradvocate.irs.gov/userfiles/file/2014-Annual-
Report/Volume-One.pdf [https://perma.cc/M756-XP84] (highlighting the significant decline in 
the IRS’s budget); NAT’L TAXPAYER ADVOCATE, 2013 ANNUAL REPORT TO CONGRESS, at  
20-21 (2013), http://www.taxpayeradvocate.irs.gov/userfiles/file/2013FullReport/Volume-1.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/NH66-YRP6] (arguing that the IRS needs additional funding).   
 251. In 2014, 99.1% of individual returns were not audited. Of the 0.9% audited, about 
71% were mere “correspondence” audits with the remainder involving meeting with an 
auditor. INTERNAL REVENUE SERV., Data Book (2014) 23 tbl.9a, https:// 
www.irs.gov/pub/irs-soi/14databk.pdf [https://perma.cc/V7XY-C4AH] (189,656,600 total 
returns / 983,025 correspondence audits = 71%). The term “audit” does not include auto-
mated contact through IRS’s Math Error Program (notifying taxpayers of self-evident math 
errors), the Automated Underreporter program (notifying of discrepancies between sources 
of information), or returns rejected for specific suspicions (e.g., identity theft). See, e.g., 
U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-13-151, TAX GAP: IRS COULD SIGNIFICANTLY 
INCREASE REVENUES BY BETTER TARGETING ENFORCEMENT RESOURCES 3-5 (2012), 
http://www.gao.gov/assets/660/650521.pdf [https://perma.cc/B9QR-MX2U] (Math Errors 
and Automated Underreporter programs); see also INTERNAL REVENUE SERV.,  
2013 DATA BOOK, at iii (2013), http://www.irs.gov/file_source/pub/irs-soi/13databk.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/UXJ4-U6AB] (rejecting returns with indicia of fraud or identity theft). 
 252. See Treas. Reg. § 1.170A-13 (as amended in 1996) (record keeping and return 
requirements for charitable deduction). 
 253. INTERNAL REVENUE SERV., 2013 1040 INSTRUCTIONS, at A-9 (2013). 
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more audits would lead to the collection of more tax revenue and 
would probably improve compliance overall.254 The limited number of 
audits reflects the limited resources of the IRS—it is not an agency 
strategy. For the most part, returns are selected based on an auto-
mated scoring of factors likely to reveal additional revenue to be col-
lected.255 Returns are ranked by these scores, and then certain re-
turns are selected for audit based on available resources.256 However, 
due to resource limitations, not all returns determined likely to pro-
duce additional revenue can be audited.257 This means that the IRS 
must focus its investigatory resources on that very small number of 
returns: 0.9%.258 This miniscule rate does not reflect confidence in  
the remaining 99.1% of returns, but rather reflects the practical  
inabilities of the IRS to gather the information needed to determine  
taxpayers’ liabilities.259 
 The current system in which the IRS has broad legal authority but 
actually reviews very little information inadvertently succeeds at 
protecting taxpayer privacy. But, it fails in collecting the taxes owed. 
It is as if the New York Police Department were authorized to search 
anyone in the city at any time, but the crime rate soared because 
there were only a dozen police officers in the city. The tax compliance 
gap—the difference between the income tax liability legally owed and 
the amount timely paid—is about $450 billion each year.260 To put 
that into context, consider that the Department of Defense budget is 
about $673 billion.261 The tax compliance gap is almost four times the 
size of the Department of the Treasury budget (which includes the 
IRS).262 And, it is larger than the combined budgets of the Small 
                                                                                                                  
 254. MICHAEL I. SALTZMAN & LESLIE BOOK, IRS PRACTICE & PROCEDURE ¶ 8.01[1],  
at 1 (2016).  
 255. Id. ¶ 8.01[2], at 2. 
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 259. U.S. TREASURY INSPECTOR GEN. FOR TAX ADMIN., IMPLEMENTATION OF FISCAL 
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Work, 17 FLA. TAX REV. 725 (2015) (offering proposals for improving function without in-
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 260. This is the gross tax gap. IRS Releases New Tax Gap Estimates; Compliance Re-
mains Statistically Unchanged from Previous Study, INTERNAL REVENUE SERV. (Jan. 6, 
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 261. OFFICE OF MGMT. & BUDGET, EXEC. OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT, BUDGET OF THE 
UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT, FISCAL YEAR 2013, at 84 (2012), https://www.gpo.gov/ 
fdsys/pkg/BUDGET-2013-BUD/pdf/BUDGET-2013-BUD.pdf [https://perma.cc/4VS6-D5W3].  
 262. Id. at 167 (about $110 billion). 
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Business Administration,263 the National Science Foundation,264 the 
Department of Homeland Security,265 the Department of the Interi-
or,266 the Department of State and Other International Programs,267 
the Department of Education,268 the Department of Housing and Ur-
ban Development,269 the National Aeronautics and Space Admin-
istration,270 the Department of Energy,271 the Environmental Protec-
tion Agency,272 the Department of Commerce,273 the Department of 
Justice,274 and the Department of Labor.275 Except to the (relatively 
small) extent that the gap reflects delinquent taxpayers financially 
unable to pay,276 the gap reflects tax-relevant information the IRS 
does not have: information revealing a taxpayer who should have 
filed a return but did not, or who did file a return but understated 
income or overstated exemptions, deductions, or credits.277 In the cur-
rent system, taxpayer privacy is protected by the same dysfunction 
that protects the tax gap: the practical inability of the IRS to gather 
tax-relevant information not included on the tax return. 
 The tax gap has been called the “great white whale of deficit re-
duction,” and, not surprisingly, closing the gap is an ongoing political 
concern.278 When both government agencies and private companies 
pursue the “growing gush of data” generated by an ever-increasing 
number of internet-connected devices,279 the hopes of politicians and 
tax administrators to more successfully leverage information tech-
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 264. Id. at 190 (about $7.5 billion). 
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 276. Failure to pay is the smallest of the three sources. IRS Releases New Tax Gap 
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 277. Tax Complexity, Compliance, and Administration: The Merits of Simplification in 
Tax Reform: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on Fin., 114th Cong. 1-2 (2015) (statement of 
Sen. Orrin G. Hatch, Chairman, S. Comm. on Finance). 
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Orrin G. Hatch). 
 279. Richard Clarke, Richard Clarke on the Future of Privacy: Only the Rich Will Have 
It, WALL ST. J. (July 7, 2014, 3:45 PM), http://online.wsj.com/articles/richard-clarke-on-the-
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ERWITT, THE HUMAN FACE OF BIG DATA (2012); Solove, supra note 108, at 1394.  
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nology in tax administration will be fulfilled.280 Between the pressure 
of the tax gap and the efficiency potential of information technology, 
we should expect the IRS to collect more and more tax-relevant in-
formation over the next twenty-five years.281 Narrowing the informa-
tional disparity between taxpayers and the IRS will also narrow the 
inadvertent protection of taxpayer privacy. As the tax gap is nar-
rowed by the narrowing of the gap between the information the IRS 
has and the information taxpayers have, the inadvertent protection 
of taxpayer privacy will also be narrowed. 
B.   The Privacy Burden 
 If the law deems certain taxpayer information relevant and bur-
dens the taxpayer with being prepared to provide it, we should con-
sider the burden on the taxpayer’s privacy as if he or she is prepared 
to provide the information. No doubt, there is comfort in the igno-
rance most taxpayers have as to what information is subject to IRS 
review. However, this is a false comfort and is something only those 
audited are likely to realize. But to know the privacy burdens of vari-
ous tax provisions, we should consider the burdens shouldered by 
those who are audited, rather than those who merely entered receipt 
totals as prompted by their return preparation software. For exam-
ple, consider that, with respect to her medical expense deduction,282 
Rhiannon O’Donnabhain had to disclose that as a 10-year-old boy she 
began secretly cross-dressing;283 as a teenager, she wanted to be rid of 
her penis;284 she had held a knife while feeling the urge to cut off her 
penis;285 her children were embarrassed and angered by her;286 and 
                                                                                                                  
 280. Jay A. Soled, Call for the Gradual Phase-Out of All Paper Tax Information 
Statements, 10 FLA. TAX REV. 345, 360-64 (2010) (calling for third parties to provide 
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reducing burdens on both the IRS and taxpayers); 1 NAT’L TAXPAYER ADVOCATE,  
2009 ANNUAL REPORT TO CONGRESS 343 (2009), https://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-
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IRS Commissioner Doug Shulman to the Leaders and Legends Series, Johns Hopkins 
Carey Business School, Baltimore, INTERNAL REVENUE SERV. (May 18, 2011), 
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 281. See Michael Hatfield, Taxation and Surveillance: An Agenda, 17 YALE J.L. & TECH. 
319, 340-50 (2015). 
 282. O’Donnabhain v. Comm’r, 134 T.C. 34, 76-77 (2010) (finding hormone therapy and 
sex reassignment surgery are deductible expenses to treat gender identity disorder disease 
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 283. Id. at 35.  
 284. Petition for Redetermination of Deficiency, O’Donnabhain, 134 T.C. 34 (No. 6402-
06), 2006 WL 1056936, at 5(c). 
 285. O’Donnabhain, 134 T.C. at 40 n.17. 
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she hesitated to take female hormones so long as her son was still in 
high school.287 Her therapist provided the government with details of 
their counseling sessions and her professional opinions, including 
that the therapist had ruled out O’Donnabhain’s cross-dressing as a 
mere sexual fetish.288 Her surgeon provided details of her gender re-
assignment surgery, including that the surgery was intended to leave 
her capable of sexual arousal.289 The point here is not that the tax-
payer should be protected from any queries beyond the receipt totals. 
But rather, that perhaps something less than unbridled inquisition 
would suffice. 
 Obviously, the IRS needs the authorization to collect relevant in-
formation. But the question is, what information should be relevant 
for tax purposes? Privacy concerns should not be dismissed with “but 
we have to know that in order to apply the law.” The issue is not 
what the law deems relevant, but rather what the law ought to deem 
relevant. Tax law is not science. It is not even economics.290 It does 
not involve aiming at a scientific measure of the economic ability to 
pay tax—some objective measure that logically unfolds and must be 
followed wherever it leads. There is no Platonic form of “taxable in-
come” determining what information is tax relevant. Tax law embod-
ies many competing policies and compromises. Revenue collection sits 
alongside health care, poverty relief, housing, education, and econom-
ic stimulation in terms of goals pursued through the tax system.291 
Even with a fundamental, economics-oriented tax provision like de-
preciation deductions, the law is not driven by economics, accounting, 
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or revenue collection but rather, a policy of economic stimulation.292 
There is no reason that minimizing privacy burdens cannot be valued 
alongside promoting health care, poverty relief, and economic growth. 
 But the point is not just that a pro-privacy policy can be added 
into the mix of tax policies. Rather, it is that we should be concerned 
that there are few (if any) activities that cannot be swept into the tax 
code. It should not be that the expansive reach of the tax code re-
moves the privacy concerns we might otherwise have. The privacy 
issues that would be debated if the Department of Health and Hu-
man Services were to require anyone who underwent gender re-
assignment surgery to submit details of any prior urges to genital 
mutilation and hatred by close family members should also be debat-
ed in the tax context, as this is the type of information Rhiannon 
O’Donnabhain was required to report to the IRS. This is not to say 
that medical deductions should not require substantiation. But, using 
the tax code to subsidize medical care should not obscure the fact 
that this is a health care policy and not a revenue collection policy. In 
whatever way privacy interests ought to be balanced in federal 
healthcare policies, those interests also ought to be similarly bal-
anced when those policies are pursued through the tax code. If 
providing certain information to government agents would make 
someone anxious, embarrassed, or otherwise uneasy, that is a subjec-
tive privacy harm regardless of the agency.293 If requiring individuals 
to report this type of information shifts or upsets the balance of pow-
er between individuals and institutions, then such a requirement is a 
threat to a free and democratic society, not just an emotional injury 
to an individual.294 If it chills behavior, undermines personal devel-
opment, or offends human dignity, then it does these regardless of 
the title of the statute.295 Titling information requirements “tax” does 
not alter the consequences. 
C.   The Invasiveness of Tax Law 
 To appreciate the invasiveness of tax law, noticing how many non-
financial personal details are required on the most commonly filed 
individual income tax return, the Form 1040, is only a first step. 
What is required on the face of the return is just the tip of the ice-
berg. The iceberg itself is what the taxpayer must be prepared to 
                                                                                                                  
 292. See, e.g., Yoram Margalioth, Not a Panacea for Economic Growth: The Case of 
Accelerated Depreciation, 26 VA. TAX REV. 493, 508-10 (2007) (arguing against IRS provid-
ing accelerated depreciation).  
 293. See Calo, supra note 125, at 1133 and accompanying text. 
 294. See Allen, supra note 104, at 738 and accompanying text; Rubenfeld, supra note 
117, at 784; Solove, supra note 116, at 1145-46.  
 295. See generally discussion supra Part II. 
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provide to substantiate the face of the return. It is the information 
the IRS is authorized to collect from all taxpayers, though the IRS 
only collects it on the 1% who are audited. While the details of tax-
payer audits are not disseminated by the IRS, those taxpayers who 
appeal their audits have their personal information publicized in 
court records. By sampling these cases, as well as the IRC, Treasury 
Regulations, and IRS publications, the extent of the tax law’s inva-
siveness becomes apparent. These samplings show how notes from 
therapist sessions, love letters, reading lists and details of daily life, 
family dynamics, and personal plans are routinely tax relevant. 
1.   Face of the Tax Return: The Tip of the Iceberg 
 First consider a few examples of the non-financial information re-
quired on the face of Form 1040. The return reveals the taxpayer’s 
occupation and whether or not he or she has lost a job, retired, prem-
aturely invaded his or her retirement accounts, or moved fifty or 
more miles away.296 It reveals whether the taxpayer or the taxpayer’s 
dependent is a college student, the name of his or her college, the 
type of study program, how long he or she has been studying, and 
whether or not he or she has been convicted of a drug felony.297 The 
return reveals whether the taxpayer is married, and, if married, 
whether or not the spouse is blind or disabled or whether the taxpay-
er is recently widowed or divorced.298 It reveals the taxpayer’s citi-
zenship status and whether or not the taxpayer is blind, has health 
insurance, or medical expenses.299 It also reveals the number of chil-
dren who live with the taxpayer and those of the taxpayer’s children 
who do not live with him or her due to divorce or separation.300 The 
                                                                                                                  
 296. IRS, Form 1040 U.S. Individual Income Tax Return (2016) [hereinafter 2016 Form 
1040] https://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-prior/f1040--2016.pdf [https://perma.cc/5XMT-3PY2] (sig-
nature block, occupation; Lines 15, 16, 20, retirement benefits; Line 19, unemployment 
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 297. 2016 Form 1040, supra note 296, https://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-prior/f1040--2016.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/5XMT-3PY2] (Line 34, tuition and fees); IRS, Form 8863 Education Cred-
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mony received and paid; Line 39a, blind spouse); IRS, Form 2441 Child and Dependent 
Care Expenses (2015) (Part II, Line 2, identifying care recipient). 
 299. 2016 Form 1040, supra note 296 (Line 39b, dual status alien; Line 39a, blind tax-
payer; Line 61, health care coverage; Line 40, itemized deductions); IRS, Schedule A (Form 
1040) Itemized Deductions (2016) [hereinafter 2016 Schedule A], https://www.irs.gov/ 
pub/irs-prior/f1040sa--2016.pdf [https://perma.cc/C75V-HTHY] (Line 1, medical and dental 
expenses). 
 300. 2016 Form 1040, supra note 296 (Line 6, dependent children exemptions). 
618  FLORIDA STATE UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 44:579 
  
return reveals the citizenship and residency status of such children, 
whether the taxpayer has adopted a child and, if so, whether the 
child has a disability, special needs, or is foreign born.301 Finally, it 
reveals whether the taxpayer has placed a child or disabled spouse in 
day care, and, if so, the name of the daycare provider.302  
 But to understand how much information is relevant in determin-
ing income tax liability—and thus within the IRS’s authority to re-
view—it is misleading to look only at the face of the return. We 
should look at what taxpayers who are audited must reveal to sub-
stantiate the face of their returns. No doubt, it would be quite a sur-
prise for the 99% of taxpayers who are not audited to realize how 
many details of their personal lives are subject to scrutiny and cate-
gorization for tax purposes. 
 There are an extraordinary number of private details about per-
sonal lives that may be tax relevant. To identify details as private 
does not mean it is necessarily unjust to collect those details. Line-
drawing is inevitable, and details necessary to discern the line 
should not necessarily be off-limits. But, the lines ought to be drawn 
with an awareness of the invasive nature of gathering the details on 
either side of the line. Privacy concerns do not necessarily outweigh 
other factors. Still, privacy concerns should be weighed with the 
other factors. What type of society would we be fostering if all tax-
payers were actually forced to provide all of the tax-relevant infor-
mation that they are legally obligated to be prepared to provide? 
Would it contribute to or undermine expression and innovation?303 
Would it express respect for individual personality, dignity, and in-
tegrity?304 Would it unduly reduce the number of spaces in which 
individuals could find relief from scrutiny and categorization?305 
Would it increase Americans’ experiences of powerlessness, vulner-
ability, and dehumanization?306 Would there be unjustifiable risks 
of inappropriate use if all of the information were aggregated?307 It 
is not to say that the IRS should not collect what information is rel-
evant; but rather that what is relevant should be defined based on 
                                                                                                                  
 301. IRS, Schedule 8812 (Form 1040A or 1040) Child Tax Credit (2016), 
https://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-prior/f1040s8--2016.pdf [https://perma.cc/92Z7-W7SZ]; 2016 
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 302. IRS, Form 2441 Child and Dependent Care Expenses (2015), 
https://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-pdf/f2441.pdf (Part I, identifying care provider; Part II, identi-
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 303. See Cohen, supra note 109, at 1909, 1911. 
 304. See Bloustein, supra note 100, at 1000-01; Warren & Brandeis, supra note 35, at 195.  
 305. See Cohen, supra note 109, at 1906; Westin, supra note 106, at 1020-24.  
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the presumption that the IRS is going to collect it—each and every 
time, from each and every taxpayer.  
2.   Substance of the Tax Return: The Iceberg 
(a)   Example: Therapist’s Sessions, Medical Advice, and  
Family Dynamics 
 To begin moving from the tip to the mass of tax-relevant infor-
mation consider what information is collectible on every taxpayer 
who claims the medical expense deduction.308 It is claimed on about 
10,000,000 tax returns each year.309 A miniscule number of those 
taxpayers will be required to provide any more information than 
what is required on the face of the return. Of course, that does not 
mean that what is provided on the face of the return is the only in-
formation relevant to determining one’s tax liability. Very few tax-
payers have any idea of what they should be prepared to reveal. 
Rhiannon O’Donnabhain was certainly forced to reveal more private 
information than most taxpayers are likely to be prepared to reveal 
when entering an amount of medical expenses on the faces of their 
returns. Does it seem likely that she suffered anxiety, embarrass-
ment, or unease by having the details of her perception of her genita-
lia, her gender, her relationship with her children, and her discus-
sions with her therapist scrutinized and categorized for tax purpos-
es?310 But under current law, she was required to reveal whatever 
information the IRS deemed necessary.311 O’Donnabhain was not a 
criminal; she was not a would-be tax evader; and she was not even 
wrong to claim the deduction. She rightfully deducted the costs of the 
surgery, and was entitled to most, though not quite all of the $5,115 
tax savings she reported on her return as a result of her total medical 
expense deductions. But, because she was part of the 1% who are au-
dited, she was obligated to reveal to the IRS whatever information 
the IRS considered relevant. 
(b)   Example: YMCA, Cancer, and Adult Children 
 Of course, it is no surprise that substantiating a medical expense 
deduction would raise privacy issues. But provisions that seem 
“merely” financial raise significant issues too. Consider the provision 
                                                                                                                  
 308. I.R.C. § 213 (2012) (providing a deduction for substantial medical expenses). 
 309. Less than 7% of returns claim medical expense deductions. See Justin Bryan, 
Individual Income Tax Returns, 2011, in INTERNAL REVENUE SERV., STATISTICS OF 
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excluding gain on the sale of a home.312 As an exclusion, it is not even 
reported on the face of the return.313 Thus, so long as the taxpayer is 
not audited, it may never occur to the taxpayer to consider what 
types of details may be relevant. Ramsay and Elizabeth Farah found 
out that their involvement in the Rotary Club, the YMCA, the Mary-
land Symphony Orchestra, and the local swim club was relevant.314 
As was Mrs. Farah’s diagnosis with an aggressive form of cancer.315 
But, perhaps more surprisingly, it was also relevant that their 
daughter Veronica applied to only one college, was admitted and at-
tended there, that she worked in various restaurants and night clubs 
while in college, and that her parents routinely visited her to give her 
medication;316 that their son Frederick liked to use the hot tub at 
their home with his friends;317 and that their daughter-in-law, Chris-
tina, spent many nights with them owing to their son, Patrick, en-
gaging in extramarital sexual activities.318 The adultery of one adult 
son, the hot-tubbing of another adult son, and the number of colleges 
to which an adult daughter applied and her need for her parents to 
medicate her were all tax relevant for excluding gain on the sale of 
the parents’ home. Imagine a system in which every taxpayer, con-
sidering selling his or her home, knew these sorts of details of their 
lives and their adult children’s lives were subject to scrutiny for de-
termining the tax consequences of a sale. Would that be a system 
likely to cause a sense of powerlessness, vulnerability, or dehumani-
zation?319 How would it affect how the taxpayer relates to the gov-
ernment?320 Would the concern be different if this type of information 
was reportable to the Department of Housing and Urban Develop-
ment or the mortgage-holding banks? 
(c)   Example: Living Rooms, Daughters, Mothers-in-Law 
 Many other facially financial provisions raise similar issues. Con-
sider what Katia Popov had to reveal as a result of taking a “home 
                                                                                                                  
 312. I.R.C. § 121(a) (excluding gain on principal residence sales). 
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office” deduction.321 A professional violinist, Katia Popov had to de-
scribe not only her practice routines at home, but also the layout of 
her apartment, the furnishings in her dining and living room, wheth-
er her four-year-old daughter was allowed to play in the living room, 
and additionally, she had to disclose that she, her husband, her 
daughter, and, on occasion, her Bulgarian mother-in-law slept in the 
same bedroom.322 How do you think providing this information affect-
ed Popov’s sense of “breathing room?”323 Even though she proved her-
self entitled to the $700 tax savings that she had claimed, do you 
think she considered revealing that her mother-in-law shared the 
bedroom with her and her husband worth it? Do you think she expe-
rienced any “unwelcome mental states” by providing this infor-
mation?324 If everyone who entered the receipt totals for a home office 
deduction into their return preparation software was aware of the 
privacy invasiveness brought into play by the deduction, how many 
would still claim it? Which society is preferable, the one in which 
there are no home office deductions or the one in which the govern-
ment reviews who sleeps where in a house to ensure that mothers-in-
law never sleep in the “home office?” Are there less invasive ways to 
draw the relevant lines? 
(d)   Example: Reading Lists, Winter Drives, and Fun 
 Consider what Melvin Nickerson had to document in order to 
prove that he was a sufficiently motivated farmer entitled to business 
deductions.325 It was relevant that he “was born in 1932 in a farming 
community in Florida,” and that he “worked evenings and weekends 
on his father’s farm until he was 17,”326 that he spent his weekends 
working on his farm, commuting five hours through Illinois and Wis-
consin, even during the winter, but often without his wife and chil-
dren,327 and that he “read trade journals and Government-sponsored 
agricultural newsletters.”328 Consider that the Treasury Regulations 
specifically made relevant whether “the taxpayer derives personal 
pleasure from engaging in the activity. . . .”329 This prompted the IRS 
to argue that Nickerson was too “motivated by a love of farming that 
stems from his childhood” to be entitled to business deductions from 
                                                                                                                  
 321. The home office deduction was about 35% of the total business deductions Popov 
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his farm.330 Nevertheless, Nickerson prevailed in substantiating his 
farming business deductions because the court was convinced he did 
not drive “five hours in order to spend his weekends working on a 
dilapidated farm solely for fun, or that his family derived much 
pleasure from the experience.”331 To be clear, Nickerson rightfully 
deducted his business expenses. He was starting a new business. He 
was dedicated. He was a hard worker—indeed, he had two jobs, 
which is what caused his tax troubles. What if every American be-
ginning a new business was forced to detail and defend his or her 
business plan, as Nickerson was? Would it chill creativity and inno-
vation if everyone undertaking a business venture knew he or she 
might need to provide his or her reading lists for government review 
and determination of sincerity, as Nickerson did?   
(e)   Example: Love Letters, Derogatory Comments, and Gifts 
 Consider Lynette Harris, who needed to disclose handwritten love 
letters to show she had reason to believe that presents from her sex 
partner were indeed gifts and not payments.332 Would a system in 
which everyone who receives gifts must be prepared to turn over the 
details of their sex lives contribute to the sort of relationship between 
government and citizens that we want in a free society?333 Would it 
shift power in undesirable ways?334 Is it at all relevant that the love 
letters that needed to be revealed were written by someone other 
than the taxpayer? What does this say about the invasiveness of the 
law when a federal judge can easily summarize the “current law on 
the tax treatment of payments to mistresses,” which is not to be mis-
taken for the law on the tax treatment of payments to prostitutes?335 
For mistresses, “cash and property [are] received from a lover as 
gifts,” which are tax-free.336 Prostitutes, however, receive only “specif-
ic payments for specific sessions of sex,” which are taxable.337 How 
many people who receive gifts from lovers are prepared to reveal to 
the government what Harris had to reveal: that, despite making “de-
rogatory statements about sex” with the man who gave her the gifts, 
his letters gave her reason to believe that he at least thought the re-
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lationship a loving one.338 If we would not prefer a society in which 
everyone who receives a gift must be prepared to reveal whatever 
may be relevant to determining the giver’s state-of-mind, why have 
we created a tax system that needs these revelations? Harris pre-
vailed in proving she was no tax evader. But, it seems unlikely that 
most other Americans are as prepared as Harris was to reveal her 
private life. The salaciousness of her situation should not distract us 
from realizing how vulnerable taxpayers are to such open-ended in-
quiries into their relationships. Given the extensive digital trails of 
information Americans are compulsively creating with social media 
and other technologies, such inquiries now could be made much more 
quickly and deeply than in Harris’s case. She, after all, turned over 
handwritten letters; today, e-mail, texts, tweets, photos, videos, social 
media postings, and GPS coordinates are searchable and retrievable 
in far more efficient ways. 
D.   Privacy Concerns in Context 
 Of course, tax administrators are not reviewing medical records, 
reading lists, and love letters in order to monitor and regulate per-
sonal lives. These information pursuits are within the context of col-
lecting revenue to fund government programs in one of the most eco-
nomically and technologically advanced countries on earth. Arguably, 
privacy harms are merely collateral damage to an essential function. 
Personal lives are often scrutinized through the legal system, and it 
is not clear that scrutiny for tax purposes should be more concerning. 
Indeed, some may argue that the IRS is already so over-burdened 
that privacy-motivated obstacles to its enforcement efforts would be 
too much to add, or too likely to benefit only economically elite tax-
payers, especially to the extent demands for personal information are 
related to the taxpayer’s demands for tax benefits. While it is im-
portant to consider these larger points within the context of demands 
for taxpayer information, it is equally important to realize how these 
concerns distort rather than focus the bigger picture. 
1.   Professional Indifference to Information Demands  
 Above, it was noted that even if all sorts of ill effects might come 
from an excessively invasive tax system, tax scholars have not 
sounded alarms. As professionals, it is easy to accept collateral dam-
age when the mission is important, and knowing the importance of 
the tax system, as well as its complications, tax scholars have not 
been disturbed by the tax system’s privacy burdens. The 
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O’Donnabhain, Nickerson, Popov, and Harris cases are commonly 
included in income tax casebooks. Indeed, their familiarity, as well as 
that of other litigated tax cases likely has desensitized tax lawyers 
from noticing the ways in which taxpayers’ personal lives—and those 
of their family members—are opened for government scrutiny and 
categorization. As lawyers, we know the importance of facts in dis-
putes, and our strategic appreciation of the factual case, along with 
our familiarity with the legal methods of gathering facts, makes us 
professionally numb when personal lives are split open for dissection 
and discussion. But, these taxpayers were merely taxpayers, filing 
their returns and taking their chances with the audit lottery. Indi-
vidual tax returns report information on over 289,000,000 individuals 
each year.339 The information relevant to those returns includes not 
only the financial information of the taxpayer but also all sorts of 
personal information of the taxpayer, his or her spouse and depend-
ents, and, as we can see above, even family members who are not de-
pendents, such as the Farahs’ adult children and socially related 
third parties, such as Harris’s boyfriend. If the audit lottery did not 
protect taxpayer privacy, and each taxpayer had to provide all of the 
information relevant to determining his or her tax liability, surely 
professional numbness to privacy issues would be replaced by per-
sonal queasiness. At least for those of us whose lives are reflected on 
the face of tax returns. 
2.   Drawing Lines in Light of Information Obligations  
 Of course, tax scholars also know that lines must be drawn and 
distinctions made in any legal system. In our tax system, it is neces-
sary to draw lines between bona fide businesses and expensive hob-
bies (which a farm like Melvin Nickerson’s might be) or between gifts 
and compensation for services (which the payments to Lynette Harris 
might have been), between square footage in the home used for per-
sonal purposes and that for business purposes (which Katia Popov’s 
living room was), or which of a taxpayer’s residences is the ‘principal’ 
one for which gain can be excluded (which was the issue for Mr. and 
Mrs. Farah). But, currently, almost none of the taxpayers with these 
issues actually provide any of the information the line-drawing obli-
gates them to be prepared to provide. If we imagine a world in which 
all of the taxpayers had to provide all of their tax relevant infor-
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mation, we would be imagining a world of dystopian fiction. There is 
no legal objection that these taxpayers could have raised to resist 
providing this information. This is the information deemed relevant 
under current law. The privacy harms of the federal government in-
specting our medical records, our adult children’s hot-tubbing and 
marital lives, how we arrange our living rooms, what is written in 
our love letters, and whether or not we read enough about our busi-
ness interests are all limited for the time being by the IRS’s practical 
inability to collect so much information. Our privacy is protected only 
by an underfunded IRS. It is not that the IRS should not collect what 
is relevant, but rather, that what is relevant should be defined on the 
presumption that the IRS is going to collect it—each and every time, 
from each and every taxpayer. 
3.   Over-Burdened IRS Unduly Burdened by Privacy Claims  
 In the contemporary context of an underfunded IRS, raising 
concerns about taxpayer privacy might be mischaracterized as an 
attempt to unduly burden an already unduly-burdened system.340 
But privacy should not be understood as a mere obstacle to efficient 
tax administration. Much of the contemporary scholarship on tax 
privacy does this, however.341 It is as if only would-be tax evaders 
have an interest in minimizing how they are scrutinized and cate-
gorized. The scholarship echoes the arguments against privacy that 
only the guilty have secrets to hide.342 But this mistakes the func-
tion of privacy. Privacy should be protected because it protects hu-
man development, dignity, and the capacity for self-determination, 
and these in turn contribute to an innovative culture, a free socie-
ty, and a deliberative democracy.343 Protecting individuals from ex-
cessive observation, scrutiny, and categorization is not an individ-
ualistic agenda, but rather one of promoting societal good.344 No 
one argues that the values protected by the Constitution ought to 
be ignored to the extent that they impede efficient policing. A socie-
ty in which the police do not have legitimate authority to search all 
of us is a society in which most of us prefer to live, even if it means 
fewer criminals are searched and fewer crimes prevented. Privacy 
protections may cover the guilty as well as the innocent, but that is 
not an argument against privacy. Mistaking privacy for an obstacle 
to an improved tax system rather than a societal good itself pre-
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sents a false dichotomy. It obscures the ways in which tax law 
might be reformed to greater serve societal good. 
4.   Widely Distributed Privacy Burdens of the Tax System 
 Some might argue that reforming tax law to promote privacy 
would, ultimately, protect economic elites as they are the ones who 
actually pay the most—and presumably evade the most. Historical-
ly, the anti-tax privacy political agitation came from political pro-
gressives focused on economic elites.345 But that historical agitation 
must be seen in its historical context: an income tax imposed only 
on the economic elites.346 By the end of World War II, the income 
tax had become a mass tax, and the anti-privacy political agitation 
had ended.347 Some contemporary scholars have tried to spark an 
anti-tax privacy movement by appealing to this historic effort.348 
But the historic situation and income tax regime of that period has 
long since passed. Today’s situation and regime is extraordinarily 
different. This is no longer a tax system focused on economic elites; 
it reports information on over 90% of the U.S. population.349 In-
deed, far from being a system focused on the economic elites, about 
one-third of the individual income tax returns filed report less than 
$20,000 in adjusted gross income.350 Today’s income tax system co-
vers even the very poor who file income tax returns only to collect 
cash welfare payments through the Earned Income Tax Credit 
(EITC). Approximately 19% of the returns filed claimed the EITC, 
which is the most significant anti-poverty cash payment govern-
ment program.351 The audit rate on returns claiming the EITC is 
twice what it is for individual return filers, generally.352 The tax 
system also covers those low-to-moderate income individuals and 
families who qualify for government subsidized health insurance 
under the Affordable Care Act.353 With a tax system that has devel-
oped over the past half century such that it is no longer focused on 
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prior/f8962--2016.pdf [https://perma.cc/3TVG-2UAD] (Lines 1-6, measuring household in-
come relative to poverty line). 
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collecting revenue but also on spreading economic benefits, protect-
ing privacy is not about protecting economic elites. 
5.   Paying for Tax Benefits with Information 
 Privacy concerns also should not be dismissed on the notion that 
taxpayers are only burdened if they choose certain benefits. There is 
no argument that non-compliant taxpayers should be entitled the 
same protections as compliant ones. The argument is that careful 
thought should be given to what is demanded as compliance. Person-
al information is not just demanded to verify deductions and credits 
that benefit taxpayers. It is also demanded to determine what is in-
cluded in gross income. Even if deductions and credits were always 
optional, inclusion is never optional. And, it is not always the case 
that deductions and credits are optional.354 But more importantly, to 
frame privacy as a compliance issue only for those who choose to 
make use of the benefits versus those financially able to forego them, 
fails to consider how those privacy choices would impact the effec-
tiveness of tax-based incentives and ignores the societal good of pro-
tecting privacy. Hayes Holderness has made the point that, economi-
cally, providing a benefit only for those willing to surrender privacy is 
a de facto tax on privacy. 355 As a matter of equity, it should never be 
that those who can financially afford greater privacy from the gov-
ernment are the only ones who should have it. Making privacy into a 
personal choice of tax benefits also ignores why tax benefits are often 
provided, which is to incentivize certain behavior. For example, to the 
extent the housing market is stimulated and sustained by excluding 
gains on the sale of homes, the incentives to sell would be under-
mined if taxpayers rationally considered the privacy burdens of the 
exclusion. Those taxpayers who value privacy more would be less 
sensitive to the incentive and those who value it less would be more 
sensitive to the incentive. Using the tax code to tether the housing 
market to privacy sensitivities makes no sense. Similarly, to the ex-
tent that the medical expense deduction is used to subsidize health 
care, making the subsidy amount inverse to an individual’s privacy 
concerns makes no sense. To impose a greater tax burden on those 
who choose greater privacy would discourage privacy, not only reduc-
ing the personal and societal benefits of privacy, but also reducing var-
ious societal benefits intended to be achieved through the tax code. 
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6.   Information Already Known to Third Parties 
 It has been argued that what information is collected for tax pur-
poses is not especially private, as it is usually financial information 
often times already held by third parties.356 If, in fact, whatever pri-
vacy burden imposed on taxpayers is imposed independently of the 
tax system, then, perhaps it is not so important to worry about priva-
cy in the tax system. It is largely true that much financial infor-
mation is held by third parties before it is reported to the IRS for tax 
purposes. To some extent, this reasoning is circular, however, as 
third parties maintain a great many of their records because they are 
required to do so for tax reporting purposes.357 But, more important-
ly, even if most financial information is held by third parties, as 
pointed out above, much tax information is not financial information. 
That Katia Popov’s daughter was not allowed to play in the living 
room, that the Farahs had an adulterous son, that Melvin Nickerson 
read farming newsletters, that Lynette Harris had handwritten love 
letters, and that Rhiannon O’Donnabhain’s children hated her gen-
der reassignment is not financial information. 
 No doubt, despite its personal rather than financial character, 
some of this information would have been held by third parties re-
gardless of whether the IRS sought it. But some of those parties 
would have also had a confidential relationship with the taxpayer, 
such as Rhiannon O’Donnabhain and her therapist. That taxpayers 
provide personal information while seeking specialized help should 
not mean that we should have no hesitation to demand that it be 
provided to the IRS. Some of the information may have been availa-
ble in public records; perhaps the Farahs’ son’s divorce court proceed-
ings revealed his extramarital activities. Some of it may have been 
casually known to any number of individuals or available through a 
quick online search, like the Farahs’ involvement in the local Rotary 
Club. But, when even publicly available information is aggregated, 
privacy concerns increase rather than decrease.358 Aggregation allows 
the holder of the aggregated information to know more than any of 
the third parties who held only a part of the information. The Su-
preme Court has recognized the qualitative difference that comes 
from aggregating data. It has held, for example, that access by the 
press to rap sheets containing all of an individual’s criminal convic-
tions can be restricted, even though each of those convictions is pub-
licly available independently.359 By depositing all of this information 
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into a single space, the risks of inappropriate use or dissemination, 
either through the negligence of insiders or theft by outsiders, greatly 
increases.360 In short, the fact that tax information is held by third 
parties, regardless of its collection by the IRS, may be relevant in as-
sessing the privacy harms of the IRS also collecting this information. 
But it does not mean that there are no privacy concerns as to the IRS 
collecting it as well.  
 Finally, unlike the information taxpayers have provided to third 
parties for whatever reason, the taxpayer is legally compelled to pro-
vide the information to the IRS. When a taxpayer signs a tax return, 
he or she is swearing or affirming under penalties of perjury that it is 
true and correct to the best of his or her knowledge and belief.361 Fil-
ing a false return is a felony.362 Taxpayers are legally compelled to 
provide substantiating information to the government, whether it is 
the paycheck information that is already known to their employers, 
the personal information known only to their therapists and sur-
geons, or details as to where the visiting mother-in-law slept, which 
is known to no one outside the family. The taxpayer cannot choose 
not to disclose the information. 
E.   Recommendations 
 How should tax law be reformed to promote privacy? This is the 
first time this question has been asked. But it is not legislative pro-
posals that are needed at this point, but rather a foundation on and 
context from which society can articulate and debate proposals. What 
is needed is scholarly attention to building that foundation and artic-
ulating that context. What is needed is for privacy scholars to recog-
nize tax law as a fertile field for privacy research and for tax scholars 
to recognize privacy as an important good to cultivate within the  
tax field. 
1.   Privacy as a Tax Policy 
 To identify an information requirement as a privacy burden is not 
necessarily to condemn it. Rather, it is to identify an analysis to be 
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made. It is to ask, is this burden justifiable? Privacy burdens in taxa-
tion are like complexity in taxation in that, at first glance, both al-
ways seem better to be reduced. But both privacy burdens and com-
plexity in taxation may often reflect benefits that are tightly targeted 
to individual circumstances, making it difficult to reduce either the 
invasiveness or the complexity without reducing the benefits.363  
 In general, it seems likely that personal privacy invasions may 
often be justified by the need to assess personal circumstances. How-
ever, tax scholars should pursue this question in particular ways, 
searching to balance specific harms and benefits. First, provisions 
should be assessed one-by-one, cataloging the information that is po-
tentially relevant. This requires a good familiarity with the tax law 
and practices. For example, a superficial review would not catch the 
personal information that Melvin Nickerson had to provide to prove 
the deductibility of his dairy farm business expenses, or the infor-
mation Mr. and Mrs. Farah had to provide related to the sale of their 
home. Second, the usefulness of specific information in implementing 
the specific policies of the provisions—and in minimizing the poten-
tial for fraud on all provisions—must be understood. For example, 
while acknowledging that some sensitive information must be pro-
vided to substantiate expenses, and acknowledging a history of tax-
payer aggressiveness with deducting medical expenses, surely there 
is a reasonable way to limit IRS inquiry so that no one need be put 
through what Rhiannon O’Donnabhain went through. Surely not 
everyone who claims a medical expense deduction needs to provide 
his or her therapist and surgeon’s notes for IRS review.  
 In addition to proposals for specific provisions like these, tax 
scholars should consider more fundamental reforms. These reforms 
may provide fewer targeted benefits, but greater general ones. For 
example, it may be that eliminating deductions and credits tied to 
personal and mixed personal-business expenses would eliminate the 
greatest privacy harms in one stroke. By increasing the standard de-
duction and personal exemption in exchange for this elimination, pri-
vate information may be better protected without affecting overall 
tax liabilities. It may be that taxpayers like Katia Popov, Rhiannon 
O’Donnabhain, and Mr. and Mrs. Farah would benefit more, in terms 
of both privacy protection and tax liability, if they were provided 
higher standard deductions and personal exemptions, even if the 
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home office business deduction, medical expense deduction, and prin-
cipal residence gain exclusion were eliminated. It certainly would be 
cheaper for the IRS to administer and taxpayers to comply with a law 
less demanding of complex, personal details.  
 Ultimately, pushing along this continuum towards fundamental 
reform, tax scholars will arrive at questions of the tax base itself. 
Which tax base best balances privacy promotion with revenue collec-
tion, efficiency, equity, and other goals? It may be that the individual 
income tax as it has evolved over the past century, targeting dozens 
of goals other than measuring financial ability and collecting revenue 
according to ability, is too unwieldy to continue if privacy concerns 
are seriously considered. It may be that seriously considering privacy 
concerns means cleaning-up the income tax base. Or, it may mean 
arguing for a new base. A value-added-tax, retail sales tax, or other 
consumption-based taxes by their very nature require less personal 
information. Regardless of the reform advocated, advocates should 
take privacy implications into account when articulating proposals. 
2.   Situating Tax Law as a Field for Privacy Scholars 
 The tax field is fertile for scholars with more general privacy-
related agendas. Like national security, taxation is an inherent gov-
ernment power. However, unlike national security, taxation is not 
focused on wrong doing, nor is it focused on a small number of indi-
viduals deserving increased scrutiny. If gathering information for 
security purposes is akin to searching for needles in haystacks, col-
lecting information for tax purposes is more akin to measuring the 
straws. When each year the government gathers information on 
289,000,000 individuals through a single agency, the prima facie case 
for privacy scholarship focused on that agency has been made. When 
the information gathered includes love letters, like those written to 
Lynnette Harris; the reading habits of small business owners like 
Melvin Nickerson; the sleeping arrangements of families like Katia 
Popov’s; the therapy sessions of patients like Rhiannon 
O’Donnabhain; and the marital discord, hot tub enthusiasm, and col-
lege aspirations of adult children, as well as the health and social 
club membership of home sellers like Mr. and Mrs. Farah, a case for 
real privacy concern has been made. That none of these taxpayers 
were suspected as terrorists should make their plight more, rather 
than less interesting to privacy scholars, and more, rather than less 
important as well. 
 What has protected taxpayer privacy up to this point has been 
neither law nor policy, but practical inability. And what threatens 
taxpayer privacy now is the technological reduction of practical ina-
bilities. The protection of privacy by real-world limitations rather 
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than legal ones has been noted and studied by privacy scholars be-
fore, but without noting the role of under-resourcing the IRS in pro-
tecting hundreds of millions of individuals.364 And while other privacy 
scholars have taken interest in how the technological future may be 
one in which “everything may reveal everything,” that is, the devices 
connected to the Internet of Things may provide data valuable for 
others purposes, those scholars have been focused on tasks such as 
predicting credit-worthiness or insurability.365 Other privacy scholars 
have focused on how Big Data mining is increasingly relevant to im-
portant issues like credit worthiness and insurability, and what safe-
guards should be implemented.366 But no privacy scholar has focused 
on how data from the Internet of Things or Big Data mining may be 
pursued for tax purposes. There is no reason to doubt that the IRS 
will be among all the government agencies and private companies on 
earth pursuing and analyzing this “growing gush of data.”367  
 Perhaps the greatest goal for privacy scholars focused on tax 
should be discerning if this growing gush of private information can 
be channeled for tax purposes without shipping us into a dystopian 
future.368 Warren and Brandeis understood the concern that privacy 
reflect an advanced state of law and civilization, one in which the 
inner life of individuals was prized and protected.369 Privacy schol-
ars have pushed that idea along, articulating how privacy is essen-
tial for the thriving of both autonomous individuals and free socie-
ties. Yet, the ongoing information technology revolution will chal-
lenge both individuals and societies in unprecedented ways. As in-
formation technology revolutionizes tax administration in the com-
ing decades, those benefits may include lower compliance burdens 
on individual taxpayers and lower administrative costs for the gov-
ernment. But, given how much personal information will be covered 
by the coming technology and how much personal information is 
potentially tax relevant, it is hard to have anything but a dystopian 
vision of this future—a vision in which individuals’ inner lives are 
so burdened that the great achievements of our society shrivel. It 
will be up to the most creative of the privacy scholars to articulate a 
vision in which the government efficiently collects information to 
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tax individuals justly while protecting the inherent dignity of their 
inner lives—that is, their privacy. 
 V.   CONCLUSION 
 A therapist’s notes, hand-scrawled love letters, and an entrepre-
neur’s reading lists may be relevant to determining a tax liability 
and, thus, may be within the IRS’s authority to collect. But these 
burdens on taxpayer privacy are not a matter of a rogue bureaucracy 
pursuing what it should not. The burdens are a matter of legislative, 
administrative, and judicial decisions deeming information relevant 
for tax liabilities. Despite the extraordinary reach of the IRS into pri-
vate lives, the law and scholarship have focused only on regulating 
what the IRS does with the private information it possesses, not the 
burdens it imposes when it collects information. While the burdens 
on human dignity and a free society posed by systemic disregard for 
personal privacy is, in principle, always a matter of legitimate con-
cern, the ongoing information technology revolution transforms the 
matter into a pressing practical concern. The law should deem rele-
vant for tax purposes only what information can be collected consist-
ently with respect for privacy. Technologically, the time is coming 
when almost all information will be far more easily pursued and col-
lected than has been imaginable.370 The tax policy goal should be to 
structure the collection and use of private information for tax purposes 
in ways that support, rather than undermine “deliberative democracy” 
and the individual’s “capacity for self-determination” while efficiently 
and justly maximizing tax revenue collection.371 To invoke Samuel 
Warren and Louis Brandeis, the goal should be a tax system appropri-
ate for both an advancing economy and an advancing civilization. 
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